

Linguistics for ELT: The Systematic Study of Meaning

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Submission date: 03-Sep-2019 08:47AM (UTC+0700)

Submission ID: 1166430758

File name: Language_Teaching-The_Systematic_Study_of_Language-lengkap.docx (200.96K)

Word count: 24969

Character count: 131797

**LINGUISTICS FOR ENGLISH
LANGUAGE TEACHING:**
The Systematic Study of Meaning

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STAIN Batusangkar Press
2014



INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH SEMANTICS



INTRODUCTION TO THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF MEANING


Introduction

Meaning is the main concentration studied in semantics. A meaning of a sentence even a word can be studied from expression and many other different ways. In this chapter, it will be discussed about: (1) simple model of communication, (2) approaches to meaning: It is seen from the standpoint of philosophy, psychology, neurology, semiotics and linguistics; (3) the linguistic study of meaning and (4) branches of the study of meaning in language: lexical semantic, grammatical semantics, logical semantics and linguistic pragmatics.

Simple Model of Communication

Meaning makes little sense except in the context of communication: the notion of communication therefore provides as good a place as any to start an exploration of meaning, (Cruse, 2000). Communication can be conveyed very broadly, but here, this model of communication shows us the transfer information between human beings as shown in Figure 1 in the following.

Figure 1: Simple Model of Communication



In the present model, the process begins with a speaker who has something to communicate, that is, the **message**. Since the message in their initial form cannot be transmitted directly, they must be converted into a form that can be transmitted, namely, **signal**. In ordinary conversation, this involves a process of **linguistic encoding**, that is, translating the message into a linguistic form into a set of instructions to speech organ, which, when executed, results in an acoustic signal. The initial form of this signal may be termed the **transmitted signal**.

Every mode of communication has a channel, through which the signal travels: for speech, we have the auditory channel, for normal writing and sign language, the visual channel, for Braille, the tactile channel, and so on. As the signal travels from sender to receiver, it alters in various ways, through distortion, interference from irrelevant stimuli or loss through fading. These changes are referred to collectively as **noise**. As a result, the signal picked up by the receiver (the **received signal**) is never precisely the same as the transmitted signal. Once the signal has been received by the receiver, it has to be **decoded** in order to retrieve the original message. In the ideal case, the message reconstructed by the receiver would be identical to the message that the speaker started out with.

In the transfer of information in a communication, it is worth distinguishing three aspects of meaning:

- a. Speaker's meaning : speaker's intended meaning
- b. Hearer's meaning : hearer's inferred meaning
- c. Sign meaning : this can be taken to be the sum of properties of the signal which make it (a) more apt than other signals for conveying speaker's intended message, and (b) more apt for conveying some message than others

In the case of an established signalling system like language, the meanings of the signs are not under the control of the users; the signs are the property of the speech community and have fixed meaning.

Approaches to Meaning

There are several disciplines ¹ which are concerned with the systematic study of meaning. Cruse (2000:10-12) asserts that there are five academic disciplines closely related with meaning, namely philosophy, psychology, neurology, semiotics and Linguistics. Moreover, Kreidler (2001:2-3) claims that there are three fields have relationship with meaning, such as psychology, philosophy and linguistics. There is significant degree of overlap between the disciplines, but characteristics of all have something idiosyncratic and unique in their approach.

1. *Philosophy*: Philosopher of language are concerned with how we know, how any particular fact that we know or accept as true is related to other possible facts—what must be antecedent (a presupposition) to that fact and what is likely consequence, or entailment of it; what statement are mutually contradictory, which sentences express the same meaning in different words, and are unrelated.
2. *Psychology*: Meaning is major concern of the psychology of language and psycholinguistics. A distinctive feature here is the experimental study of how meanings are represented in the mind, and what mechanisms are ²involved encoding and decoding messages. Psychologist are interested in how individual human learn, how they retain, recall,, or lose

information; how they classify, make judgements and solve problem. In other words, how the human mind seeks meaning and works with them.

3. *Neurology*: Neurologists want to know how mental states and processes are implemented at the neuronal level. Neurologists can be illustrated as the designer of computer chips. Meaning, like everything else in mental life must boil down ultimately to connections between neurons.
4. *Semiotics*: Semioticians view language as one sign system amongst many and seek out those features which render it so successful. They are also likely to give emphasis to marginal aspects of linguistic significations.
5. *Linguistics*: There are three key aspects to encapsulate the linguistic approach to meaning. The first is that native speakers' semantic intuitions are centered stage, in all their subtlety and importance of relating meaning to the manifold surface forms of language. The third is the respect paid not just to language but to languages.

Furthermore, linguists want to understand how language works. When two or more people share a language, it makes possible for them to give and get information, to express their feelings and their intentions to one another, and to be understood with a fair degree of success? Linguistics is concerned with identifying the meaningful elements of a specific language, for example, English words like *paint* dan *happy* and affixes like the *-er* of *painter* and the *un-* of *unhappy*. It is concerned with describing how such elements go together to express more complex meanings—in phrases like *the unhappy painter* and sentences like *The painter is unhappy*—and telling how these are related to each other. Linguistics also deals with the meaning expressed by which hearers and readers relate new information to the information they already have.

The linguistic study of meaning in language?

All meaning is potentially reflected in appropriateness for communicative intent. This fitness of meaning will be identified by using contextual normality: every difference of meaning between two expressions will show up as a difference of normality in some context. In this approach, we take abnormality/oddness and relative oddness/normality to be primitive intuition. For example: *illness* and *desease* do not mean the same, because *during his illness* is normal, but *during his desease* is not. *Almost* and *nearly* do not have precisely the same meaning, because *very nearly* is normal; *Very almost* is not. *pass away* and *kick the bucket* have different meanings because *It is with great sadness that we report that our Beloved Ruler kicked the bucket two minutes after the midnight* is odd; but *It is with great sadness that we report that our Beloved Ruler passed away two minutes after midnight* is normal

Branches of the study of meaning in language

1. Lexical semantics

Lexical semantics studies the meaning of words; the focus here is on 'content' words like *table*, *inconsiderate*, *happiness* rather than 'form'/'grammatical' words such as *the*, *of*, *than*, and so on. In this case, words are what are listed in the dictionary and the main function of a dictionary is to tell us what are the listed word means. For this reason, lexical semantics perhaps provides the easiest access route into the mysteries of semantics in general, and this is one reason why it has been given a prominent place in this book.

2. Grammatical semantics

Grammatical semantics studies aspects of meaning which have direct relevance to syntax. Consider, for example, the differences in the meaning of *yellow* in the following:

- a. She wore a *yellow* hat (adjective)
- b. They painted the room a glowing *yellow* (noun)
- c. The leaves *yellow* rapidly once the frosts arrive (verb)

Another aspect of grammatical semantics is the meaning of grammatical morphemes like the *-ed* of *walked*, *-er* of *longer*, the *-al* of *retrial* and so on.

3. Logical semantics

Logical semantics studies the relation between natural language and formal logical systems such as the propositional and predicate calculi. Such studies usually aim at modelling natural language as closely as possible using tightly controlled, maximally austere logical formalism. It is arguable that sometimes such studies shed more light on the formalism used than on the language being modelled; none the less, valuable insights have come from this approach. To date, most such studies have concentrated on the propositional/sentential level of meaning, and have rarely attempted to investigate into the meaning of words.

4. Linguistic pragmatics

Linguistic pragmatics can be taken to be concerned with aspects of information (in the widest sense) conveyed through language which (a) are not encoded by generally accepted convention in the linguistic forms used, but which (b) none the less arise naturally out of and depend on the meanings conventionally encoded in the linguistic forms used, taken in conjunction with the context in which the forms are used. Pragmatics is usually contrasted with semantics, which therefore deals with conventionalized meaning; obviously, the three divisions discussed above (lexical semantic, grammatical semantic and logical semantics) belong to semantics.

Conclusion

From the previous description, it can be concluded that meaning could be different depend on what approach is being used. There are some approaches to the study of meaning such as philosophy, psychology, neurology, semiotics and linguistics. Linguistic study of meaning in a language can be grouped into four, namely lexical semantics, grammatical semantics, logical semantics and linguistic pragmatics.

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TYPES AND DIMENSIONS OF MEANING


Introduction

The purpose of the present chapter is to discuss the range of possible varieties of meaning in English language. It is under the umbrella of types and dimensions of meanings. They include (1) reference and denotation meaning (2) connotation meaning, (3) lexical meaning, (4) grammatical meaning, (5) sentence meaning, (6) utterance meaning, (7) communicative meaning, (8) social meaning, (9) expressive meaning and (10) evoked meaning.

Reference and Denotation meaning

A language consists of a large number of words and each of these words has direct correlation with something outside of language, which is its meaning. If we communicate with one another through language, it must be that we all have the same 'idea' or 'concept' associated with each word. This view was elaborated by Ogden and Richard cited in Kreidler (2001) who developed a mentalistic theory about meaning in the following scheme.

Figure 2: mentalistic theory of meaning



The bond between *word* and *concept* is called *association*; the bond between *concept* and *object* is called *reference*; and the bond between *object* and *word* refers to *meaning*.

When we hear or read a word, we often form a mental picture of what the word represents, and so we are apt to equate ‘concept’ with a mental picture. To be sure, it is easier to form a mental picture for some words—DOOR and CAT, for example—than for others such as ORDINARY or PROBLEM or PRETEND. But the idea of a mental picture is misleading. What mental picture do you form for DOOR? A revolving door? A folding door, a sliding door, moving horizontally? An overhead door which moves vertically? A door turning on hinges? Is it in a wall, or on a cabinet, or part of a car? You can picture all of these in sequence but not simultaneously. Clearly, the meaning of DOOR is more than what is included in a single image, and our knowledge of this word is much more than the ability to relate them to single objects. We can use these words successfully in a large number of situations because you have knowledge that makes this possible.

Materna (2010:1) claims that the terms denotation and reference are commonly used as synonyms like distinction between sentence and utterance. Further, it is explained that **reference** is the relation between a language expression such as *this door, both doors, the cat, another cat* and whatever the expression pertains to in a particular situation of language use, including what a speaker may imagine.

Meanwhile, **denotation** is the potential of a word like *door* or *cat* to enter into such language expression. Reference is the way speakers and hearers use an expression successfully; denotation is the knowledge they have that makes their use successful.

Connotations meaning

According to Bezuidenhout (1998) connotation describes the interaction that takes place when the sign meets the emotions of the user and the values of his culture. Connotation is directly related to the inner reality of the user/receiver and is thus highly subjective. Connotation involves emotional overtones, subjective interpretation, socio-cultural values and ideological assumptions. For example, how particular society values the dog is an example of connotation of the word *dog*. The Eskimos considers a dog as an animal that is used for pulling a sled; the Parsees regards the *dog* as nearly sacred; Hindus consider the *dog* a great pet and Moslem view the *dog* as forbidden animal to be touched. The meaning of *dog* includes the attitudes of society and of individuals, pragmatic aspect.

2 A denotation identifies the central aspect of word meaning, which everybody generally agrees about. Connotation refers to the personal aspects of meaning, the emotional associations that the word arouses. Connotations vary according to the experience of individuals but, because people do have common experience, some words have shared connotations.

Lexical meaning

Lexical meaning relates to the association between lexeme and something outside of language. Its investigation focuses on content words (3 basically nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs) or open-set item. Open-set items have the following characteristics:

- a. They belong to relatively large substitution sets.
- b. There is a relatively rapid turnover in membership of substitution classes, and single speaker is likely to encounter many losses and gains in a single lifetime
- c. Their principal function is to carry the meaning of a sentence

There is no limit to the particularity or richness of the meaning an open-set element may carry, as there are no requirements for recurrent meanings or wide co-occurrence possibilities. Hence, open-set items typically carry the burden of the semantic content of the utterances. Because of the richness of their meanings and their unrestricted numbers, they participate in complex paradigmatic and syntagmatic structures.

Grammatical meaning

Grammatical meaning concentrates on the meaning of function words (such as, preposition, article, determiner, auxiliary, affixes) or closed-set item. Closed-set items have the following characteristics:

- a. They belong to small substitution sets.
- b. Their principal function is to articulate the grammatical structure of sentences
- c. They change at a relatively slow rate through time, so that a single speaker is unlikely to see loss or gain of items in their lifetime. The inventory of items in a particular closed-set grammatical category is effectively fixed.

A closed-set item, in order to be able to function properly as grammatical element, has to be able to combine without anomaly with a wide range of roots. Therefore, the meaning of 'past', 'present', and 'future' which can co-occur with virtually any verbal notion, and 'one' and 'many', which can co-occur with vast numbers of nominal notions, are prototypical grammatical meaning.

Sentence meaning

According to [Reidinger \(2001\)](#), sentence meaning can be explained by two points. First, the meaning of a sentence derives from the meaning of its constituent lexemes and from the grammatical meaning it contains. So, if we know all the lexical and grammatical meaning expressed in a sentence, we know the meaning of the sentence, vice versa. Second, at least if the sentence is a statement, if we know the meaning of the sentence, we know the conditions are necessary in the world for that sentence to be true. [Lobner \(2002\)](#)

states that the meaning of a sentence as a whole is a concept for a specific kind of situation.

Utterance meaning

Lobner (2002:7) states that utterance meaning comes about when a sentence with its meaning is actually used in a concrete context. First of all, utterance meaning involves reference. In addition to, and in connection with, reference another central notions comes into play, the notion of truth. Utterance meaning is also of concern for semantics: it has to explain how reference and truth depend on context of utterance.

When someone produces an utterance, the addressees usually make all kinds of inferences. The inferences are somehow triggered in the addressees' mind what is actually being said from ¹ what is inferred. So, utterance meaning is the totality of what the **speaker intends to convey by making an utterance**, (Cruse, 2000). The propositions are expected to be inferred by the hearer on the basis of contextual information. For example:

- (1) A : *Have you cleared the table and washed the dishes?*
B : *I've cleared the table*

In normal circumstances, in the first case, it would be clearly be part of B's intended message that s/he had not washed the dishes.

- (2) A : ³ *Am I in time for supper?*
B : *I've cleared the table*

In the second case, it is obviously the speaker's intention to convey the proposition that A is too late for supper.

The investigation of inferences in both examples above, the role of participants in communication and how they are related to the meaning is an important part of linguistic discipline called pragmatics, the scientific study of the rules that govern language use.

Within pragmatics, Paul Grice's theory of conversational implicatures deals with inferences of this kind.

Communicative meaning

Communicative meaning concentrates on the study of speech acts. The central idea of speech act theory is that whenever we make an utterance in a verbal exchange we act on several levels. *Locutionary Act*, the first level, is the act of using a certain expression with a certain meaning, in the given context of situation. In doing so, we also perform *Illocutionary Acts*, on the level on which the utterance constitutes a certain type of "speech act": a statement, a question, a request, a promise, a refusal, a confirmation, a warning, etc. This type of meaning lies outside the range of semantics. Rather, it is of central concern of pragmatics.

Social meaning

Social meaning comprises meaning in social interaction. Talking to others is a social interaction. Any verbal utterance will receive an interpretation as a communicative act and it always has social function. Social meaning is a part of the expression meaning. Let us consider an example. Sheila is on the train in Germany and is addressed by the ticket inspector.

- (3) a. : *Ihre Fahrkarte, bitte!-Danke?* (German)
b. : *Deine Fahrkarte, bitte!-Danke* (German)
c. 'Your ticket, please-Thank you

The expression (3a) would be appropriate if Sheila is an adult and no acquaintance of the inspector. The third person plural form of possessive pronoun *ihre* literally 'their' is required for the formal, or polite, a style of speech used for addressing adults. (3b) contains the simple second person singular possessive pronoun *dein* and would be the proper, informal, form of address if Sheila is a child, a relative or a close acquaintance of the ticket inspector.

All languages have a set phrases with a clear-cut social meaning, and no other. There is a social rule that defines the circumstances under

which it is properly used and what it means. This is, in general, the defining criterion of expressions with social meaning: an expression or grammatical form has social meaning if and only if its use is governed by the social rules of conduct or, more generally, rules for handling social interaction.

Expressive meaning

Expressive meaning is part of the lexical meaning of certain expression, a semantic quality of words and phrases independent of the context of utterances (CoU) and of the way they are being spoken. In short, expressive meaning deals with the expression of a personal emotion, opinion or attitudes, (Lobner, 2002). This type of meaning has closely related with the expressive function of language. There are two kinds of expressive meaning, namely those with exclusively expressive meaning and others with descriptive and expressive meaning.

The most typical instances of expressive with exclusively expressive meaning are words and phrases used for directly expressing an emotion, feeling or sensation. Some feelings, sensations, attitudes and evaluation can be expressed in two ways—subjectively and directly by means of expressives, like *ouch*, *wow*, *oh* and objectively by forming sentences with the respective descriptive meaning, like, *oh my goodness*, *Gosh*, *That's hurt*, and so on.

Beside interjection, exclamation, like *thank God*, *hopefully* can be inserted into sentence to add personal attitude to the situation expressed. The following example may illustrate:

- (4) a. : *Hopefully Bob will arrive tonight. –Really?*
b. : *I hope Bob will arrive tonight. —Really?*

In English and presumably most other languages, there exist emotionally charged terms for persons, such as *idiot*, *bastard*, *motherfucker* or *ass-hole* for offensive part, or *darling*, *baby*, *honey* as terms of affection. Most expressive terms add negative attitude to

the descriptive meaning, others are just emotional. Positive expressive meaning are rare.

Evoked meaning

Dialectal variation is variation in language use according to speaker, and register variation is variation within the speech of a single community according to situation. Usage characteristics of a particular dialect or register have the power of evoking their home context, and in the case of register variants, of actually creating a situation. Such association, which have no propositional content, are called **evoked meaning**.

There are three types of dialects, namely geographical, temporal and social. The first type is about place where the dialect used. The second type of dialect will vary depends on the age of speaker. The third type of dialect vary according to social class of the speaker. The three types of dialect creates situation, evoked meaning.

Different type of register also create evoked meaning. A well-known division of register is **field, mode, and style**. **Field** refers to the area of discourse: specialist in a particular field often employ technical vocabulary to refer to things which have everyday names. For instance, doctors, when talking to other doctors, will speak of a *pyrexia*, which in ordinary language would be called a *fever*, or just a *temperature*. Of course, the apparent sameness of meaning between an expert word and everyday word is sometimes illusory, since the technical term may have a strict definition which makes it descriptively different from everyday term.

Mode refers to the difference between language characteristic of different channels, such as spoken, written, telegraphic and e-mail. For instance, *further to* is more or less exclusive to written language, whereas *like* (as in *I asked him, like, where he was going*) is definitely spoken. **Style** is a matter of the formality/informality of an utterance. So, for instance, *pass away* belongs to a higher (more formal) register than, *die* and *kick the bucket* belongs to a lower register.

Conclusion

From the description above, it can be concluded that there are several types and dimensions of meaning. They include (1) reference and denotation meaning (2) connotation meaning, (3) lexical meaning, (4) grammatical meaning, (5) sentence meaning, (6) utterance meaning, (7) communicative meaning, (8) social meaning, (9) expressive meaning and (10) evoked meaning.

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INTRODUCTION TO LEXICAL SEMANTICS

Introduction

In a descriptive introduction to meaning, it is inevitable that the meanings of word should loom large, even though in more formally oriented accounts, word meanings are left largely unanalyzed, or are reduced to mere skeletons of their true selves. Most (linguistically innocent) people have an intuition that meaning is intimately bound up with individual words; indeed, this, *par excellence*, is what words are for. In this paper, it will be discussed about the nature of word, what is word?, lexical and grammatical meaning, word meaning and sentence meaning, semantic approaches and the last is brief description of some lexical relations.

The Nature of Word Meaning

Cruse (2000:91) claims that most people have an intuition that meaning is intimately bound up with individual words. While such an intuition seriously underestimates other aspects of meaning, it is not, in itself, wrong, and adequate introduction to meaning should not shrink from the slipperiness and complexity of words meaning

simply because it cannot be neatly corralled into a favored formalization.

What is word?

Cruse (2000: 91-92) explains that the notion of word as notoriously resisted precise definition. Probably, the best approach is a prototypic one. To see how prototypical word looks like the classical characterization as a minimal permutable element will serve. This attributes two features to a prototypical word:

1. It can be moved about its sentence, or at least its position relative to other constituent can be altered by inserting new material.
2. It cannot be interrupted for its parts be reordered.

Further, he explains that constitute the meaning³ of a word must form a continuous dependency chain. This means that there must be a relation of dependency between elements and there must be no gaps in the chain which need to be filled by semantic element from outside the word.

Another way of approaching the meaning of word is to take an extensional viewpoint and ask what are the characteristics of a 'possible nameable'. Nameables are distinguished linguistically by the ability to take proper names, but also by the ability to be referred to by means of singular, non-collective count nouns. The characterization of nameability would require reference to adjectives and verbs, as well as noun.

Lexical and Grammatical Meaning

Cruse (1986: 89-90) argues that grammatical unit can be divided into closed-set items and open-set items. Central examples of closed-set items have the following characteristics:

1. They belong to small substitution set.
2. Their principal function is to articulate the grammatical structure of sentences.
3. They change at a relatively slow rate through time, so that a single speaker is unlikely to see loss or gain of items in their lifetime.

3
Meanwhile open-set items have the following characteristics:

1. They belong to relatively large substitution sets.
2. There is relatively rapid turnover in membership of substitution classes and a single speaker is likely to encounter many losses and gains in a single lifetime.
3. Their principle function is to carry the meaning of the sentence.

3
Both closed and open-set items carry meaning, but their different function means that there are differences in the characteristic of the meanings that they typically carry. A closed-set item, in order to be able to function properly as a grammatical element has to be able to combine without anomaly with a wide range of roots and it must have flexible meaning or broad enough and it must signal contrasts which recur frequently.

In contrast there is no limit to the particularity or richness of the meaning an open-set element may carry. Open-set items typically carry the burden of semantic contents of utterance. Because of the richness of their meaning and their unrestricted numbers, they participate in complex paradigmatic and syntagmatic structure.

Lexical semantics is by and large the study of the meanings of content words and is oriented principally to the contribution that open set items make to this. Grammatical semantics concentrates on the meaning of the closed-set items.

Word Meaning and Sentence Meaning

Cruse (1986: 90) says that in general, word meanings are not the sort of semantic units that one can communicate with on an individual basis, unless other meaning components are implicit. A word, on its own, does not actually say anything.

Meanwhile, a sentence is a grammatical unit, it is a string of words of a particular type, whose well-formedness conditions are specified in the grammar of the rule. Although a sentence, outside of particular

uses, does not have a truth value, it does have a truth conditions which must hold for the sentence to be used to make a true statement. To qualify as part of sentence meaning, a semantic property simply as to be a stable conventional property of some linguistic expressions.

Lobner (2002:21-22) claims that the meaning of a word, more precisely a content word (noun, verb, adjective), is a concept that provides a mental description of a certain kind of entity. Meanwhile, the meaning of a sentence is a concept that provides a mental description of a certain kind of situation.

Approaches to Lexical Meaning

There are some approaches to lexical semantics according to Cruse (2000: 96-102):

One-level vs. two-level approaches

In the view of dual-level, human beings can make and learn to recognize an almost infinite variety of speech sounds, but in any particular language, only a handful of these function distinctively to convey meanings, or enter into systematic relations of any complexity. Meanwhile, partisans of the single-level view claim that non-arbitrary basis for assigning aspects of meaning (or knowledge) to the 'semantic' or 'encyclopaedic' side of a purported dichotomy has been put forward which survives even a cursory scrutiny.

Monosemics vs. polysemic approaches

The monosemic view is that as few senses as possible should be given separate recognition in the (ideal) lexicon of a language, and as many as possible derived from these. In the other side, the polysemic approach rejects the assumption that a motivated extension of a word sense does not need to be recorded in the lexicon. The basic reason for this is that lexical rules only specify potential extensions of meaning, only some of which become conventionalized and incorporated in the lexicon.

The componential approach

This approach studies the meaning of a word as being constructed out of smaller, more elementary, invariant units of meaning, somewhat on the analogy of the atomic structure of matter. These 'semantic atoms' are variously known as semes, semantic features, semantic components, semantic markers, semantic primes.

Holist approaches

According to this belief, the meaning of a word cannot be known without taking into account the meanings of all the other words in a language. there are various versions of holism as follows:

- Haas

Haas said that the meaning of a word was a semantic field which had two dimensions: a syntagmatic dimension, in which all possible contexts of the word were arranged in order of normality and a paradigmatic dimension, in which for each context, the possible paradigmatic substitutes for the word were arranged in order of normality. Relatively was for Haas a primitive.

- Lyons

Lyons believes that meanings are not substantive, but relational, and are constituted by contrasts within the same system. Lyons states that the sense of a lexical item consists of the set of sense relations which the item contracts with other items which participate in the same field. Sense relations are not relations between independently established senses; one should rather say that senses are constituted out of sense relations.

Conceptual approaches

Conceptual approaches are single-level approaches and identify the meaning of a word with the concepts it gives access to in the cognitive system. Among cognitive linguists, the prototype model of concept structure holds sway.

Formal approaches

Formal approaches to semantics attempt to express the facts of meaning through a strict formalism, preferably closely related to one of the standard logics.

2 sense/lexical Relation: a brief description

Meaning is more than denotation and connotation. What a word means depends in part on its associations with other words, the relational aspects. McIntyre (-: 1) states that sense relations talk about how meanings of one expression (e.g. a word, phrase) relate to the meanings of other expressions. Furthermore, he explains that there are several kinds of sense/lexical relation:

Hyponymy and Taxonomies: Hyponymy is relationship of the type specific word and Taxonomy is classification of concepts in hyponymic or co-hyponymic relations

Meronymy: Meronymy is certain expressions treat parts in the same way as possessions.

Homonymy and Polysemy: Homonymy is relation between semantically unrelated words which happen to have the same pronunciation and polysemy is a polysemous word has different, but related senses.

Synonym subsists when two expressions have the same meaning.

Antonymy: Binary (non-gradable) antonymy is negation of one of a pair of antonyms entails the other antonym. Gradable antonymy is antonyms at opposite ends of a *scale* with varying degrees possible.

Metaphor and Metonymy: Metaphor is the use of the the term for one concept to refer to another concept, where they have

properties in common. Metonymy is the use of one word to describe a concept associated with the concept normally expressed by that word.

There are two kinds of linkage—syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations. **Syntagmatic** relations is the mutual association of two or more words in a sequence (not necessarily right next to one another) so that the meaning of each is affected by the other(s) and together their meanings contribute to the meaning of the larger unit. In this case, there is the relation of the lexeme with other lexemes with which occur in the same phrases or sentences. For example, *arbitrary* can co-occur with *judge*; *happy* with *child*; *sit* with *chair*; *read* with *book* or *newspaper*.

Another kind of relation is contrastive. Instead of saying *The judge was arbitrary*, for instance, we can say *The judge was cautious* or *careless* or *busy* or *irritable* and so on with numerous other possible descriptors. This is a **paradigmatic** relation, a relation of choice. We choose from among a number of possible words that can fill the same blank; the words may be similar in meaning or have little in common but each is different from the others.

Conclusion

Finally, it can draw conclusion that even though it is quite difficult to define word, it can be stated that words are separated by spaces in writing and it has no more than one lexical root. Lexical meaning deals with the investigation of content words or open-set item; whereas grammatical meaning study function words or closed-set item. We can use some approaches to study lexical semantics, namely one level vs. two levels approaches, monosemic vs polysemic approaches, componential approaches, Holist approaches, Conceptual approaches and Formal Approaches.

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INCLUSIVE PARADIGMATIC LEXICAL RELATIONS: Hyponymy, Taxonymy and Meronymy

Introduction

There are two sense relations of paradigmatic. The first one is the relation which expresses identity and inclusion between word meanings and second expresses opposition and exclusion. In this paper will talk more about the first relation of paradigmatic which expresses inclusion. There some parts of this relation such as hyponymy, taxonymy and meronymy. They will be explained in detail in part of discussion below.


Hyponymy

According to Lobner (2001: 85) hyponymy is a relation between words that result from a relation between their meanings and leads to a relation between their denotation: the meaning of the hyponym contains the meaning of the hyperonym, and the denotation of the hyponym is a sub-category of the denotation of the hyperonym. Hyperonym is more general than hyponym. Look at this table below:

Hyponym	Hyperonym
<i>Sentence meaning</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
<i>Green cap</i>	<i>Cap</i>
<i>Tall girl</i>	<i>Girl</i>
<i>Walk slowly</i>	<i>Walk</i>

Cruse (2001:50) states that hyponymy is often defined in terms of entailment between sentences which differ only in respect of the lexical items being tested. For example, although *It's a tulip* entails *It's a flower*, *It's not a tulip* doesn't entail *It's not a flower*, nor does *The fact that it was a tulip surprised Mary* entail *The fact that it was a flower surprised Mary*.

Kreidler (1998:93) claims that the denotation of the hyponym is included in the denotation of the superordinate, but the meaning of superordinate is included in the meaning of hyponym. A sentence with a hyponym is more informative than a sentence with the corresponding superordinate. Example, *there is a Palomino in that field* is more informative than *there is a horse in that field*.



Taxonymy

Cruse (1986: 137) states that taxonymy may be regarded as a sub-species of hyponymy: the taxonyms of a lexical item are a sub-set of its hyponyms. Taxonymy is the relation of dominance of a taxonomy: the corresponding horizontal relation - the relation

between sister-nodes – will simply be labeled co-taxonymy, to underline the intimate connection between the two.

A useful diagnostic frame for taxonymy is:

An X is a kind/type of Y

If X taxonymy of Y, the result is normal:

Example: A mango is a kind of fruit.

1 The diagnostic frames for co-taxonymy which show must clearly the close relationship with taxonymy are:


***An X a kind of Y, and a Z is another kind of Y
and An X is a kind/type of Y, and so is a Z.***

Example: A cat is a kind of animal and so is a rabbit.

Further, Cruse (1986: 139-140) explains that recognizing **1** taxonymy is one thing: describing its essential nature is another and more difficult task. However, there are two or three lines of approach to see it. First of all, it can be observed a strong correlation between taxonymy and what are called natural kind terms, and between non-taxonymic hyponyms and nominal kind terms. Another approach is in the terms of the good category principle; people are tend to create the “best” categories as possibly can.

Meronymy

The **1** second major type of branching lexical hierarchy is part-whole type, which we call meronymies. Cruse (1986:160) claims that meronymy is a **1** subject to a greater number of complicating factors that taxonomic relations are; instead of their being a single clearly distinguished relation, there is in reality and **1** numerous family of more-or-less similar relation. The semantic relation between a lexical item denoting a part and that denoting the corresponding will be termed meronymy and the name co-meronymy to the relation between lexical items designating sister-parts.



There are some principles of meronymy according to Cruse (2000:154-155):

a. Necessity

Some parts are necessary to their wholes, whereas others are optional. For instance, *beard:face*, although a beard is a part of face, beards are not necessary to faces. On the other hand fingers are necessary to hand.

b. Integrality

Some parts are more integral to their wholes than others. One way of diagnosing integrality is by judging how easy it is to describe the part as being attached to its whole. For example, the handle is a part of the door and the handle is attached to the door are normal, as are the hand is a part of the arm and the hand is attached to the arm. On the other hand, the fingers are attached to the hand.

c. Discreteness

Some parts are more clearly divided from their sister parts than others, such as, the tip of the tongue or the lobe of the ear.

d. Motivation

Good parts have an identifiable function of some sort with respect to their wholes. For example, the handle of the door is for grasping and opening and shutting the door.

e. Congruence

- 1) Range. The range of generality of meronymy is not the same as that of the holonym. When the meronym is more general than the holonym, but completely includes it, it is called supermeronym. And when the two ranges overlap, it is called semi-meronym. For example, *handle:knife/umbrella*, *wheel:car/train*, etc.
- 2) Phase. Parts and wholes are phase congruent when they exist at the same time. For example, *grape-juice:wine* or *flour:bread*. It is not wholly wrong to say that grape-juice is a part of wine or flour is part of bread. But it will be more correct to speak of ingredients.
- 3) Type. Prototypical parts and wholes are of the same ontological types. The consistent type pairs are somehow better, such as *vein:vascular system* and *nerve:nervous system* instead of *vein:hand* and *nerve:leg*.

Characteristics of Meronymy

- a. Consist of elements of the same general types. If one element in meronymy denotes a cohesive physical object, then all of the other items in the set must be too. If one item is an abstract noun, all the others must be as well. Example, *family* should consist of part of family, not body.
- b. Must preserve a constant principle of differentiation throughout. For example, *body* can be divided into segmental parts: *leg, head, foot, arm* and systemic part: *nerve, vein, cell, tissue*.
- c. Every meronym should be congruent with its holonym. For example, human body meronymies are divided into male and female. There are also separate meronymies for female and male, it is elements of body.

- d. Meronymies typically have rather weakly developed substantive levels. It has analogues (similar) structure or function and perhaps size-range. For example, there are analogues in the human body meronymies; *arm* and *leg*, *hand* and *foot*, and *finger* and *toe*. There are no analogues between head and arm.

Close Relatives of the Part-whole Relation

The whole area is extremely diffuse and complex. An attempt will be made to isolate the main dimensions of variations and identify the most salient near-relatives of the core part-whole relation.

- a. Concreteness. For example bodies, trees, cars, and teapots are concrete nouns.
- b. The degree of differentiation amongst parts. For example, parts of body or car.
- c. Structural integration. Such as the *members* of a *team* are more integrated than *stones* in a *heap*.
- d. Whether the items in a relationship are count nouns or mass nouns. In almost all the parts whole-pairs, both meronym and holonym have been count nouns. But there are part-like relations where one or both terms are mass nouns. For example, *the car is part steel* (whole = count, part=mass) and *Milk is an ingredient of custard* (whole=mass, part=mass).

Entities with temporal structure may also have parts. Entities such as groups, classes and collections stand in relations which resemble meronymy with their constituent elements. They are less structurally integrated than typical physical objects, and their parts are often less differentiated. The first term is **Group-member** relation. Groups seem to be largely restricted to associations of human beings, for example: tribe, team, cabinet, committee, family, etc.

More distantly related to paronymy is a relation which called the **class-member relation**. It is exemplified by such pairs as *proletariats: worker*, *clergy: bishop*, *aristocracy: duke*, etc. Another relation

involving a collectivity is the **collection-member** relation. Collections are typically inanimate such as *heap*, *forest*, *wardrobe* and *library*. The members of collections are not normally lexically distinguished.

1 There is also a family of relations involved with what things are made of where the whole is also a mass noun. This case is also called **constituents** or **ingredients**. The distinction between these two is basically that the ingredients of X are the substances that one starts out with when one prepares X, whereas the constituents of X are the substances which enter into the final composition of X. The ingredients and constituents of X may, or may not, be the same.

Conclusion

In conclusion there are three inclusion paradigmatic relations, they are hyponymy, taxonymy and meronymy. Hyponymy is a relation between words that result from a relation between their meanings and leads to a relation between their denotation. Meanwhile, taxonymy **1** may be regarded as a sub-species of hyponymy. Semantic relation between a lexical item denoting a part and that denoting the corresponding will be termed meronymy.

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INCLUSIVE PARADIGMATIC LEXICAL RELATION: SYNONYMY

Introduction

Another kind of lexical relation is synonymy. In general, synonymy can be defined as two or more terms that have same meaning. Pairs of lexical items that have same meaning is called synonym. In synonymy, it has several degree to distinguished meanings based on certain context. The degrees of synonymy are propositional synonym, cognitive synonym, absolute synonym, near- synonym, and plesinonym, that will be explain in this paper.

Synonymy

According to Cruse (2000: 156) stated that synonymy is sameness **1**eaning. Meanwhile Cruse (1986: 88) defines synonymy as the **lexical relation** which **parallels identity in the members** **2**p of two **classes**. Kreidler (1998: 96) also defines synonymy as is **instance of mutual entailment and synonyms are instances mutual hyponymy**.

2

Two or more terms can be synonymous only if they are compatible with the same subjects. The term *hard* and *difficult* are compatible with *calculus* and with *subject*, but *difficult* is not a synonym of *hard* in *hard chair*. Synonyms are words whose semantic similarities are more salient than their differences.

Furthermore Cruse (1986: 266-267) explains there are several characteristic of synonym. First is synonyms must have a significant degree of semantic overlap, as evidenced by common semantic traits. For example, *truthful* and *honest* have a relatively high semantic overlap while *truthful* and *purple* have no traits in common.

Second characteristic is synonym must not only manifest a high degree of semantic overlap, they must also have a low degree of implicit contrastiveness. For example, although *truthful* and *honest* do not have identical meaning, saying *John is honest* the difference with *John is truthful* is not being highlighted; nor is saying *John is not honest*, is one implying that perhaps *truthful* would be more appropriate.

Another characteristic is synonyms are lexical items whose senses are identical in respect of 'central' semantic trait, but differ, if at all only in respect of what may provisionally describe as minor or peripheral traits.

Synonyms also occur together in certain types of expression. Synonym is often employed as an explanation, or clarification, of the meaning of another word. The relationship between the two words is frequently signaled by soothing like *that is to say*, or particular variety of *or*. For example, *He was cashiered* that is to say *dismissed*.

Degrees of synonymy

1. Propositional synonym

According to Cruse (2000: 158) states that propositional synonymy can be defined in terms of entailment. If two lexical items are propositional synonyms, they can be substitute in any expression with truth-conditional properties without effect on

those properties. For example, *John bought a violin* entails and is entailed *John bought a fiddle*.

Differences in the meaning of propositional synonyms necessarily involve one or more aspect of non-propositional meaning, the most important being (i) differences in expressive meaning, (ii) differences of stylistic level (on the colloquial-formal dimension) , and (iii) differences of presupposed field of discourse. Take the case *violin* and *fiddle*. Here the difference depends on certain characteristic of the speaker. If the speaker is an outsider to violinistic culture, *fiddle* is more colloquial. However, if the speaker is a professional violinist talking to another professional violinist *fiddle* is the neutral term, whereas *violin* is used mainly to outsider.

Another example, in the case of *shin: fibula*. The difference is *shin* is the everyday term, with no special expressive or stylistic loading, whereas *fibula* is used by medical specialist acting in that role.

2. Cognitive synonym

Cruse (1986: 88) stated that cognitive synonymy is the relation defined in terms of truth-conditional relations. To be cognitive synonym, a pair of lexical items must have certain semantic properties in common.

Cognitive synonymy can be defined as follow:

X is a cognitive synonym of Y if

- (i) X and Y are syntactically identical
- (ii) Any grammatical declarative sentence S containing X has equivalent truth-condition to another sentence S¹, which is identical to S except that X is replaced by Y.

For example, a pair cognitive synonym *fiddle* and *violin*. These are incapable of yielding sentences with different truth-conditions. For instance, *He plays the violin very well* entails and is entailed by *He plays the fiddle very well*.

3. Absolute synonym

Cruse (2000: 157) claims that absolute synonymy refers to complete identity of meaning, and so for the notion to have any content it must be specified what is to count as meaning. The meaning is anything which affects the contextual normality of lexical items in grammatically well-formed sentential context. Absolute synonyms can be defined as items which are equinormal in all contexts.

In other word, for two lexical items X and Y if they are to be recognized as absolute synonyms, in any context in which X is fully normal, Y is too; in any context in which X is slightly odd, Y is also slightly odd, and in any context in which X is totally anomalous, the same is true of Y. For examples:

a. *brave: courageous*

Little Billy was so brave at the dentist's this morning. (more normal)

Little Billy was so courageous at the dentist's this morning. (less normal)

b. *big: large*

He is a big baby. (more normal)

He is a large baby. (less normal)

4. Near-synonym

The borderline between near-synonymy and non-synonymy is in its principle. The first is that language users do have intuitions as to which pairs of words are synonyms and which are not. The second point is that it is not adequate to say simply that there is a scale of semantic distance, and that synonyms are words whose meaning are relatively close. There is no simple correlation between semantic closeness and degree of synonymy. Such as *animal* and *plant* or *dog* and *cat* is semantic closeness, not degree of synonymy.

Example of near-synonym is *He was killed, but I can assure you he was not murdered*. Differences between near-synonym must be either minor, or background, or both. Among 'minor' differences may be counted the following:

- a. Adjacent position on scale of 'degree': *fog:mist, laugh:chuckle, big:huge, disaster:catastrophe*, etc.
- b. Certain adverbial specialization of verbs: *amble:stroll, chuckle:giggle, drink:quaff*, etc.
- c. Aspectual distinction: *calm:placid* (state:disposition)
- d. Difference of prototype centre: *brave:courages* (prototypical physical: prototypical involves intellectual and moral factors).

An example of a backgrounded major distinction: *pretty:handsome* (female presupposed: male presupposed).

5. Plesionym ¹

Plesionyms are distinguished from cognitive synonyms by the fact that they yield sentences with different truth-conditions: two sentences which differ only in respect of plesionyms in parallel syntactic position are not mutually entailing, although if the lexical items are in a hyponymous relation there may well be unilateral entailment. There is always one member of plesionymous pair which it is possible to assert, without paradox, while simultaneously denying the other member. For example, It was not *foggy* just *misty*.

Conclusion ¹

It can be concluded that synonymy is the lexical relation which parallels identity in the membership of two classes. Meanwhile synonyms are words whose semantic similarities are more salient than their differences. The first degree of synonym is propositional synonym. It can be substitute in any expression with truth-conditional properties without effect on those properties. Second degree is cognitive synonym, it is the relation defined in terms of

truth-conditional relations. Another degree is absolute synonym, anything which affects the contextual normality of lexical items in grammatically well-formed sentential context. Next degree is near-synonym, it is contrast in sentence context, but close meaning in lexical term. The last is plesionym which yields sentence with different truth-condition.

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EXCLUSIVE PARADIGMATIC LEXICAL RELATION: Opposites and Metonymy

Introduction

Describing meaning is not easy. It is supported as what stated by Lobner (2002: 85) that it is very difficult to describe the meanings of lexemes or sentences explicitly. However, it is relatively easy to establish meaning relations between sentences or expressions. In this paper it will be explained the exclusion relation of lexical. The main points will be about opposites and its several divisions and then will be followed by the explanation about metonymy and its examples.

Opposites

Cruse (2000:167) claims that oppositeness is the only sense relation to receive direct lexical recognition in everyday language which consists of:

- Binarity. It is prerequisite which means there can only be two members of a set of opposites. For example, *X is long* entails *X is not short*. For example, *His house is far*. *His house is not near*.
- Inherentness. Inherent binarity can be considered a prototypical features for oppositeness. For example, *tea: coffee*, *fork: spoon*, etc.
- Patency. It is prototypical pairs of opposites but not sufficient. For example, *Monday* and *Wednesday* are situated in opposite direction from *Tuesday*.

Types of Opposites

1. Complementaries

As stated by Cruse (2000: 167), complementaries constitute a very basic form of oppositeness and display inherent binarity in its purest form. For example, *dead:alive*, *true:false*, *inside:outside*, *possible:impossible*, etc.

Complementary can be given a strict logical definition:

$F(X)$ entails and is entailed by $\text{not-}F(Y)$

Y or X is logically equivalent to *Y or not-Y*, which is a tautology; and *neither Y nor X* is equivalent to *neither Y or not-Y* which is a contradiction. Thus, *This proposition is either true or false* is a tautology, and *this proposition is neither true nor false* is a contradiction.

2. Antonymy

Cruse (2000: 168) explains that antonymy is frequently used as a synonym for opposites. Antonyms fall into several groups:

a. Polar antonyms

The main diagnostics features of polar antonyms are:

- 1) Both terms are fully gradable. It means that they occur normally with a wide range of degree modifiers, such as *very/slightly/rather/quite/a bit/too/long*.

- 2) They occur normally in the comparative and superlative degrees like *long, longer, longest; light, lighter, lightest*.
- 3) They indicate degrees of some objective, unidimensional physical property, prototypically one which can be measured in conventional unit such as centimeters, kilograms, miles/hours, etc.
- 4) They are incompatibles, but not complementaries. Hence, *It's neither long nor short* is not a contradiction, nor is *It's either long or short* a tautology.
- 5) Comparative forms stand in a converse relationship: specifically, if X and Y are polar antonyms and A and B are nouns, that *A is X-er than B* entails and is entailed by *B is Y-er than A*.
- 6) The comparative forms of both terms are in partial. For example *X is longer than Y* does not presuppose that X is long, similarly with *shorter*.
- 7) One of the terms yields an impartial question in the frame *How X is it?* And impartial nominalization. It is the term that indicates *more of* the relevant property that yields the impartial question: *How long/strong/big/thick/wide/fast is it?*

b. Equipollent antonyms

In the case of equipollent antonyms neither term is impartial. For instance *hotter* presupposes “hot” and *colder* presupposes “cold”. Equipollent antonyms pairs typically denote sensation (*hot:cold, bitter: sweet, painful: pleasurable*), or emotions (*happy: sad, proud of: ashamed of*).

c. Overlapping antonyms

With overlapping antonyms, one member yields an impartial comparative, and the other a committed comparative. For example, *good: bad, kind: cruel, clever: dull, pretty: plain, polite: rude*.

3. Directional Opposites

Lobner (2002: 90-91) claims that directional opposites are related to opposite directions on a common axis. For example *in front of/behind*, *left/right*, and *above/below*. For further example that involve the vertical axis are *top/bottom*, *high/low*, *up/down*, *upstairs/downstairs*, *uphill/downhill*, *rise/fall*, *ascend/descent*, etc. Time axis such as *before/after*, *past/future*, *since/until*, *yesterday/tomorrow*, *last/next*, and *preset/follow*.

a. Direction

In Cruse (1986: 223), it is explained that a direction defines a potential path for a body moving in straight line; a pair of lexica items denoting opposite directions indicate potential path, which if followed by two moving bodies would result in their moving in opposite directions. They are all adverbs or preposition such as *nor/short*, *up/down*, *forward/backward*.

b. Antipoda

Cruse (1986: 224) argues that category of antipodal opposites can be defined, in which one term represent and extreme in one direction along some salient axis, while the other term denotes the corresponding extreme in the other direction.

c. Counterparts

Cruse (1986: 225) defines counterparts as directions which are reversed. For example, a *mound* projects *out* of the earth's surface; the corresponding shape projecting *into* the earth is *depression*, similarly with *bulge*: *constriction* (in a tube or pipe), *ridge*: *groove*, *hill*: *valley*, *bump*: *dent*, and the related adjectives *convex*: *concave*.

d. Reversives

According to Cruse (1986: 226) reversives consist of those pairs of verbs which denote motion or change in opposite direction.

Further, he explains that there are two main ways of characterizing 'opposite direction' for reversible verb pairs.

- The first applies to those verbs which refer to change between two determinate states. For example, *appear/disappear, tie/untie, and enter/leave*.
- The second characterization of opposite direction involves not absolute, but relative states. Reversible verbs of this type denote changes between states defined merely as having particular relationship to one another. For example, *lengthen/shorten, widen/narrow, accelerate/decelerate, heat/cool, ascend/descend, strengthen/weaken, and improve/deteriorate*.

Reversible may also be classified in another way, Independent reversible and restitutive:

- Independent reversible is the smaller and consists of pairs one of whose members necessarily denotes the restitutions of a former state. For example, *damage/repair, remove/replace, stop/presume, and kill/resurrect*.
- In restitutive, there is one dependent and one independent term, and the dependence of the dependent term is of a logical, rather than a pragmatic. In the case of independent reversible, there is no necessity for the final state of either verb to be a recurrence of a former state, such as *fill/empty, lock/unlock, dress/undress, and mount/dismount*.

4. Converses (Relational Opposites)

Cruse (1986: 231) says that converse may be diagnosed by the fact that when one member of a pair is substitute for the other in a sentence, the new sentence can be made logically equivalent to


the original one by interchanging two of the noun phrase arguments, for example, *above/below*, *in front of/behind*, and *before/after*. In addition, Cruse (2000: 172) argues that converses are also often considered to be a subtype of directional opposite (Cruse: 2000).

a. Indirect Converses

It is stated by Cruse (1986: 233) that convers pairs in which the interchangeable noun phrases got occupy central valency slots like *follow/precede* will be called direct converses; those like *give: receive*, where a central and peripheral noun phrase are interchanged, will be called indirect converses.

b. Congruence Variants and Pseudo-opposites

Cruse (1986: 240-242) explains there are two types of congruence variant; the hypo-/super-type and the semi-type. The following are examples of two or more hypo-opposites standing jointly in a particular relation of opposition to a super-opposite:



Patient and *victim* are super-converses of their respective partners, and *thin* and *old* are super antonyms of theirs. It will be notice that two different relationships between sister hypo-opposites are illustrated. *Doctor* and *dentist*, and *murderer* and *rapist* are in compatible; *thick* and *fat*, and *young* and *new*, on the other hand differ much less radically-

they differ, in fact only in respect of collocational restrictions, and are cognitive synonym.

Fat and thin, doctor and patient are pseudo-congruent. Cases of pseudo-oppositeness occasionally occur which parallel the pseudo-synonymy of *horse* and *mare*.

Metonymy

Cruse (2000: 211-214) argues that metonymy is responsible for a great proportion of the cases of so-called regular polysemy. Metonymy and metaphor are quite distinct processes of extension, in spite of the fact that they may exist extensions that cannot be classified, because the end point could have been reached by either route. Metaphor involves the use of one domain as an analogical model to structure the conception of another domain; in other words, the process crucially involves two distinct conceptual domains. Metonymy on the other hand relies on an association between two components within a single domain.

For example, *the ham sandwich wants his coffee now*. This is 'café language', but it's perfectly intelligible to all. The domain invoked is a café, where a customer is distinguished by the fact that *he has ordered a ham sandwich*.

There are certain highly recurrent types of metonymy, as follows:

- a. Container for contain. For example,
The kettle's boiling.
Room 44 wants a bottle of champagne.
- b. Possessor for possessed/attribute. For example,
Where are you park?
Why is John not in Who's Who?
- c. Represented entity for representative. For example,
Spain won the world cup 2010.
The government will announce new target next week.

- d. Whole for part, for example,
3 *am going to wash the car.*
Do you need to use the bathroom?
- e. Part for whole
There are too many mouths to feed.
What we want are more bums on seats
- f. Place for institution
3
The white house denies the allegation.
The palace defends the sackings.

There are some reasons why people use metonymy. One possible motivation is that the expression is rendered shorter, hence more economical of effort. Another possibility is that the target entity is more easily accessible via the metonymic vehicle than directly. It is also general case that some metonyms are acceptable, whereas others ostensibly following the same general principle, are not.

Conclusion

Finally, it can be concluded that there are two forms of extension lexical relation. They are opposite and metonymy. Opposite deals with the different meanings and it is divided into several terms such as complementaries, antonymy, directional opposites and converses. Complementaries can be defined as the basic form of oppositeness. Antonymy is frequently used as a synonym for opposites that also fall into several groups. Meanwhile, directional opposites are related to opposite directions on a common axis. The next relation, converse includes kinship and social role3 and directional opposites. The last one is about metonymy which relies on an association between two components within a single domain.

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INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH PRAGMATICS



INTRODUCTION TO PRAGMATICS

4

Introduction

Pragmatics is a rapidly growing field in contemporary linguistics. In recent years, it has not only become a center of intense interest in linguistics and the philosophy of language, it has also attracted a considerable amount of attention from anthropologists, artificial intelligence workers, cognitive scientists, physiologists, and semioticians. In this case there are some topics that will be discussed (1) What is pragmatics all about?, (2) A brief history of pragmatics; (3) Why do we need pragmatics? (4) What use is pragmatics? (5) A waste-basket (6) Context and co-text

What is pragmatics all about?

According to Huang (2007:2), pragmatics is the systematic study of meaning by virtue of, or dependent on, the use of language. The central topics of inquiry of pragmatics include implicature, presupposition, speech acts, and the deixis. And Mey (1993:5) also defined pragmatics as science of language seen in relation to its users.

Meanwhile, Yule (1996:3-4) defined pragmatic in several definitions:

- Pragmatic is the study of the speaker meaning. It concerns with the study of meaning as communicated by a speaker (or writer) and interpreted by a listener or reader.
- Pragmatic is the study of contextual meaning. Pragmatics involves the interpretation of what people mean in particular context and how the context influence what is said.
- Pragmatics is the study of how more gets communicated that is said. Pragmatics also explores how listeners can make inferences about what is said in order to arrive at an interpretation of the speaker's intended meaning.
- Pragmatic is the study of the expression of relative distance. It raises the questions of what determine choice between the said and unsaid.

In conclusion, pragmatics is related to the study of meaning based on some factors such as speaker meaning, contextual meaning, listeners' inference and even the expression.

A brief history of pragmatics

As told by Huang (2007: 2), pragmatic has its origin in the philosophy of language that found by Charles Morris, Rudolf Carnap, and Charles Peirc in the 1930's. They presented a threefold division into syntax, semantics, pragmatics within semiotics that is a general science of sign. Syntax is the study of the formal relation of one side with another, semantics deals with the relation of sign to what they denote, and pragmatics addresses the relation of sign to their users and interpreters. Syntax is the most and pragmatic the least abstract, with semantics lying somewhere in between. Syntax provides input to semantics which provides input to pragmatics.

Why do we need pragmatics?

According to Yule (1996:7), pragmatic is needed if we want a fuller, deeper, and more reasonable account of human language

behavior. Sometimes, a pragmatics account is the only possible one, as in the following example.

'I just met the old Irishman and his son, coming out of the toilet.'

'I wouldn't have thought there was room for the two of them.'

'No, silly, I mean I was coming out of the toilet. They were waiting.'

Linguists usually say that the first sentence is ambiguous. For a pragmatician, there is no such thing as ambiguity. Excepting certain, rather special occasion on which one tries to deceive one partner.

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Huang (2007:5-9) defined **there are reasons for including pragmatics in an integrated linguistic theory**:

- a. *Linguistics underdeterminacy*. There is a huge gap between the meaning of a sentence and the messages actually conveyed by the uttering of that sentence. In other words, the linguistically encoded meaning of a sentence radically underdetermines the proposition the speaker expresses when he or she utters that sentence.
- b. *Simplification of semantic and syntax*. The second reason why we need a pragmatic component is because its inclusion can effect radical simplification of other core components, such as semantics and syntax, in overall theory of linguistics ability.

What use is pragmatics?

Mey (1993: 10) argues that the immanent approach to the study of language has tended to isolate its different aspects and in many cases the practitioners of linguistics have not been able to talk to each other except in very general terms. When it comes to doing things for a purpose, such as describing languages, often thought of as the prime practical endeavor of linguists, the consensus remains largely theoretical.

With the increasing westernization and industrialization, a number of many languages began to disappear and have been doing so at an ever more rapid speed. These languages are in danger of

disappearing; linguists speak of endangered languages, and vote on resolution about what to do to save those languages.

Furthermore, Mey (1993: 11) explains as long as the purpose of linguistics is seen as to go out there and collect as many species as possible of vanishing races of languages, it is clearly a catastrophe when species start disappearing on a grand scale. The linguistics remedy for this evil is to save the languages by accelerating and perfecting the descriptive, through better and more generous funding, through the training of native linguists providing teachers, and other personal that can help in alphabetizing those mostly unwritten and unrecorded languages, so at least there are some documentation to show to the successor in the trade and can parry the reproach of having squandered away the linguistic patrimony of generation to come.

A pragmatic look at the problems of endangered languages tells not just to go out there and describe, but to fight what some gave called linguistic genocide for short linguisticide.

A waste-basket?

Mey (1993: 12) claims that pragmatics is often called ‘the waste-basket of linguistics’. The notion of waste-basket itself has not always been the same. In this case, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel called semantic as the waste-basket of sytanx. The emphasis was on formal reasoning and abstract symbolism; linguistic was thought of as algebra of language. Now it has been realized that life cannot be exhaustively described by those methods. Similarly, when Chomsky started to develop his theory of language that was to become famous under the name ‘generative-transformational grammar’, he was aware that much of what the grammar purported to do could be set to hold only for a certain, limited subset of real, ‘natural language’.

Now in the philosophy of fifties, one didn’t have to think about one’s trash. And as the world changed, so did human science. Many philosophers and linguists began to be interested in what precisely went into the waste-basket and why.

Context and Co-text

Yule (2003: 129) states that there are different kinds of contexts to be considered. First kind is linguistics contexts that also known as co-text which is the set of other word used in the same phrase or sentence. It has strong effect on what someone thinks the word mean. For example, the word *bank* which is noted as homonym; when the word *bank* is used in a sentence together with word like *steep* or *overgrown*, there will no problem deciding which type of ‘bank’ is meant. In a similar way, when someone says that she has to *get to the bank to cash a check*, it is known from the linguistic context which type of bank is intended.

The other type of context described as physical context. For example, if the word BANK is seen on the wall of a building in a city, the ‘physical’ location will influence someone interpretation. Someone understanding of much of what he reads and hears is tied to the physical context, particularly the time and place, in which someone encounter linguistic expressions.

Conclusion

Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that pragmatics is the systematic study of meaning by virtue, on dependent on, the use of language. Then, Charles Morris, Rudolf Carnap, and Charles Peirc in the 1930’s, presented a threefold division into syntax, semantics, and pragmatics within semiotics that is a general science of sign.

Pragmatic is needed to get a fuller, deeper, and more reasonable account of human language behavior. However, pragmatics is actually a really purposeful study; pragmatic is often called ‘the waste-basket of linguistics’ for such a reason. In the context of pragmatics, there are two things to be considered; context and co-text. Context is how to someone understanding of much of what he reads and hears is tied to the physical context, particularly the time and place, in which someone encounter linguistic expressions. And co-text is based on physical context.

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DEIXIS

Introduction

Pragmatics studies everything all aspects related to language and its meaning. One of them is deixis. As what stated by Huang (2007: 132), the term of 'deixis' is derived from the Greek word meaning 'to show' or 'to point out.' Moreover, he explains that deixis directly concerned with the relationship between the structure of a language and the context in which the language is used. There are some basic categories of deixis that will be explained in this paper such as person deixis, temporal (time) deixis, spatial (space) deixis, social deixis and discourse deixis, but at first it will be explained about deictic and non-deictic expression and also gestural with symbolic use of deictic.

Deitic vs Non-Deitic Expression

Huang (2007:133) claims that deitic expression or deitics are expression that have a deictic usage as basic or central. Meanwhile, non-deictic expressions are expressions that do not have such a usage as basic or central.

- Example of deictic expressions such as in this sentence:
You and you, but not you, back to your dorms!
- Example of non-deictic expressions such as in the sentence:
Mary wishes that she could visit the land of Liliput.

Moreover, Cruse (2000:319) simply defines deixis means different thing to different people. It means deixis is relation between statement and it contacts. In addition, Grundy (1995:19) explains deixis as the relations of language to each point of origin. The more speaker and addressee share come on ground, the more they are able to effect reference. Reference is result by contact in the case of indexical for example, *I know you enjoy reading the chapter. You* picks out a particular but different person on each separate occasion. The utterance would be accompanied by gestures and/or eye contact.

Gestural vs Symbolic Use of Deictic Expression

Huang (2007:134) explains that gestural use can be properly interpreted only by a direct, moment by moment monitoring of some physical aspects of the speech event. By contrast, interpretation of the symbolic use of deictic expressions only involves knowing the basic spatio-temporal parameter of the speech event. Furthermore, it is explained that gestural use is the basic use, and symbolic use is the extended use. In general, if the deictic expressions can be used in symbolic it can be used in gestural way; but not vice versa.

Related to this case, Cruse (2000: 324) argues that gestural deixis related to the uses of deictics that require for someone's interpretation continuous monitoring of relevant aspects of the speech situation: in the clearest cases, the hearer has to be able to see the speaker and their gestures. In this case, the example can be seen from this sentence: *Put one over there and the other one here.* Meanwhile, in symbolic deixis such minute monitoring of the speech situation is not necessary and in general the relevant parameters for deictic interpretation are established over relatively long periods of a conversation/discourse such in this sentence: *Isn't this weather gorgeous?*

Types of Deixis

1. Person Deixis

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Huang (2007: 136) says that person deixis is concerned with the identification of interlocutor or participant-rolls in a speech event. It is commonly expressed by (i) the traditional grammatical category of person, as reflected in personal pronouns and if relevant, their associated predicate agreements, and (ii) vocatives, which can be encoded in, for example kinship term, titles, and proper names and in combination of these.

There are several basic categories of person deixis:

- a. Personal pronouns
Personal pronouns usually express person, number, and gender. They sometimes also encode distance and social relations.
- b. Person
Personal pronouns generally exhibit a three way distinction of first, second and third person. The category of first person is the grammaticalization of the speaker's reference to him or herself. Second person, is the encoding of the speaker's reference to one or more addressees. Third person is the grammaticalization of reference to persons or entities which are neither speaker nor addressees in the situation of utterance.
- c. Number
Every language has vary number category. There are some common number systems that every language has, such as singular-plural known in Chinese, West Dani, or Mizo and also singular-dual-plural such what Arabic and Tok Pisin have.
- d. Gender
In all languages with pronominal gender marking, gender can be distinguished on third person, where commonly two (that is masculine and feminine) or three (that is masculine, feminine, and neuter).

According to Cruse (2000:319), person deixis⁴ involves basically the speaker (first speaker), the addressee (second person), and other significant participants in the speech situation, neither speaker nor hearer (third person). All of these come in singular and plural form and several are marked or case.

In addition, Grundy (1995:22) claims that all pronouns require identification with some other points. For their reference to be affected in the case of deictic, the reference is determined in relation to the point of origin of utterance.

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2. Temporal (Time) Deixis

Huang (2007: 144) defines time deixis is concerned with the encoding of temporal points and span relative to the time at which an utterance is produced in a speech event.

a. 1 me.

Time is one dimensional and unidirectional. Generally, the passage of time is represented in two distinct ways; (i) to regard time as constant and the 'world' as moving through time from the past into the future and (ii) to think of the world as stable and of time¹ flowing through the world from the future to the past. A distinction can be made between time point such as 'eight o'clock' and time period such as 'tomorrow evening.' Time periods can be¹ uniquely defined in terms of their beginning and ending points. Another distinction that needs to be made is between the moment of utterance called coding time (CT) and the moment of reception called receiving time (RT)

b. 1 The encoding of time deixis.

Time deixis is commonly grammaticalized in:

- Deictic ad¹verbs of time.

Now and *then* in English are the two pure time deictics called temporal¹ demonstratives. *Now* designates "proximal" time, it can be defined as the pragmatically given (time) span including CT. By contrast, *then* refers to

“**distal**” time , and can be reduced to meaning “not now” it can be indicated time either in the past or in the future.

Deictic calendrical unit terms such as *today* and *tomorrow* and *yesterday*, this deictic names of days divide time into diurnal spans. Today can be glossed as the diurnal span including CT, *tomorrow* as the diurnal span following today, and *yesterday* as the diurnal span preceding today. Both *now/then* and *today/tomorrow/yesterday* can relate to either a time point, or an interminable time period within the relevant span, or the whole spans itself.

The use of *today/tomorrow/yesterday* pre-empts, that is, it has priority over, the use of the calendrical terms for the relevant days. *This month*, *next Monday*, and *last year* are complex deictic adverbs of time. These contain two components, a deictic component like *this*, *next* and *last*, and non deictic components like *month*, *Monday*, and *year*. The interpretation of such adverbs is systematically determined by two distinctions: (i) the distinction between calendrical (such as Thursday, July and evening), and non-calendrical (such as month, week, year), modes of reckoning of time, and (ii) the distinction between positional and non-positional calendrical units.

- Tense

Lyon¹ and Levinson in Huang (2007: 148) distinguish time into metalinguistic tense (M-tense) and linguistic tense (L-tense). M-tense is meant the theoretical category of tense, whereas L-tense is meant by linguistic realization of M-tense. M-tense may be lexically realized by means of adverbs of time or the like – expression equivalent to *yesterday*, *this week* and *next year*.

Moreover, Cruse (2000:321) adds that temporal⁴ deictic function to locate points or interval on the axis. There are three major divisions of the time axis; (i) before the moment of

utterance, (ii) at the time of utterance, (iii) after the time of utterance.

In addition, Grundy (1995:25) adds the use of time deictic is not always so straight forward and tense system is important to the time deictic. Almost every sentence makes reference to an event time often this event time can only be determined in relation to the time of the utterance.

3. Spatial (place) deixis ¹

In Huang (2007: 149), space deixis is concerned with the specification of location in space relative to that of participant as CT in a speech event.

a. Frames of spatial reference.

They are coordinate system used to compute and specify the location of object with respect to other objects. There are three linguistic frames of reference to express spatial relationship between the entity to be located and the landmark: (i) intrinsic, (ii) relative, and (iii) absolute. Intrinsic is based on object-centred coordinate, which are determine by 'inherent feature' such as the sidedness or facets of the object to be used as ground. The second, relative frame of reference expresses a ternary special relation between a few point, and a figure and a ground that are distinct from the view point. The last one, the absolute frame of reference also involves a coordinate system, but it is based on absolute coordinate like *north/south/east/west*.

b. The ¹grammaticalization of space deixis

Special deictic notion are commonly expressed by the use of (i) demonstrative including both demonstrative pronouns and adjectives, (ii) deictic adverb of space, (iii) deictically marked third person pronouns, (iv) verbal affixes of motion and verbs of motions.

c. Demonstratives and deictic adverb of space

1) Distance.

Languages can be classified according to the number of terms demonstrative and deictic adverbs of space display. One – term systems, they are supplemented by a two – term system of deictic adverbs of space. Two – term systems, it seems to be the most difficult and universal system of space deixis. Three – term systems, it is called distance – oriented. In this system, the middle term refers to a location that is so close to the addressee. Four – term systems, it is more remote from the speech situation – more than four – term systems. They are defined along the basic, single deictic dimension of distance, most are involved with more than one dimension of contrast.

2) Visibility

It is in concern with whether the entity in question is within sight of the speaker or not. First type of visibilities is Imai in Hwang (2007:156) distinguished three types of invisibilities, first type is invisibility parameter (remote) is used to mark entities that are out of sight and far from the speaker. The second type is invisible – occlusion, it is employed to refer to entities that are behind an obstacle or inside a container. The last type is invisible – periphery which is utilized to encode entities that are out of sight but audible and/or olfactory, that is to say thing that speaker can identify by their noise and/or smell but cannot see.

3) Elevation

It is the physical dimension of height relative to the deictic centre typically the speaker.

4) Side

Language in which there is a set of deictic terms which and code on which side a settlement is located along the coastline.

5) Stance

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The demonstrative must indicate the stance or motion of the referent. Whether it is “standing”, “sitting”, “laying”, “coming”, or “going”.

d. Deictically marked third – person pronoun.

1 These pronouns specify the location of the intended referent with respect to the speaker.

e. Deictic directional

1 They can be grouped into two categories: (i) kinetic or deictic motion affixes, morphemes, and particles, which mean ‘hither/thither’, and (ii) deictic motion verbs – verb such as ‘come and go’.

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In addition, Cruse (2000:320) states that spatial deixis manifests itself principally in the form of locative adverb such as *here* and *there*, and demonstratives or determiners such as *this* and *that*. The term *here* means something “region relatively close to the speaker”, and *there* means “relatively distance from the speaker”. *Here* may represent an area less than the squaremeter on which the speaker on standing *this* is a first deictic. Meanwhile, Grundy (1995:23) divides deictic proximal demonstrative into two, *this* (pl. *these*) and *that* (pl. *those*), which may be used either as pronouns or in combination with nouns.

4. Social deixis

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Cruse (2000: 322-323) claims that social deixis is exemplified by certain uses of the so-called TV (tu/vous) pronouns in many languages. The example can be illustrated by using example from French. Arguments will be presented that not all usages of TV pronouns fall properly under the heading of deixis. One which incontrovertibly does is where relative social status of speaker and hearer is signaled.

There are three basic possibilities involving two communicants A and B: (i) A addresses B with tu, B addresses A with vous ; (ii) A

addresses B with vous, B addresses A with tu; (iii) A and B both use the same form (either tu or vous). The basic parameter here is social status: tu points downwards along the scale of social status with the speaker's position as reference point, vous points upwards while symmetrical use signals social equality.

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Meanwhile, Huang (2007: 163) argues that social deixis is concerned with the codification of the social status of the speaker, the addressee, or a third person or entity referred to, as well as the social relationship holding between them. The information encoded in social deixis may include social class, kin relationship, age, sex, profession, and ethnic group. Further, he explains social deixis in these some subtopics as below:

a. Absolute versus relational social deixis

Comrie, Levinson, and Brown and Levinson in Huang (2007: 163) state the two main types of social deictic information can be identified absolute and relational. Absolute information in social deixis can be illustrated by forms that are reserved for authorized speakers or authorized recipients. For example, in imperial China there was a form zhen that was specially reserved for the emperor to refer to himself. Going next to forms that are reserved for authorized recipients, restrictions are placed on most titles of addresses such as Your Majesty, Mr Presidents, and professor in English.

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b. Four axes of relational social deixis

Relational information in social deixis can be represented between:

- a) Speaker and referent (e.g. referent honorifics)
- b) Speaker and addressee (e.g. addressee honorifics)
- c) Speaker and bystander (bystander honorifics)
- d) Speaker and setting (level of formality)

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Referent honorifics are forms that are employed by the speaker to show respect towards the referent. Addressee honorifics are forms that are used by the speaker to show deference towards

the addressee. Bystander honorifics are form that used by the speaker to signify respect to a bystander, including participant the role of audience and non-participant overhearers. Speaker-setting axis has to do with the relationship between the speaker (and perhaps other participations) and the speech setting or event.

- c. The expression of social deixis
Social deixis can be accomplished by a wide range of linguistic devices including personal pronouns, forms of address, affixes, clitics and particles, and the choice of vocabulary.
- d. Personal pronoun
Personal pronouns can be used to achieve a number of socially deictic effects.
- e. Forms of address
Forms address are another common way of realizing social deixis. They include different types name such as first name (e.g. James), last name (e.g. Bond), and a combination of first and last name (e.g. James Bond)
- f. Affixes, clitics, and particles
Socially deictic information can also be encoded by affixes, clitics, and particles. Verb forms in Korean, for example, may select one of the following suffixes attached.
- g. Choice of vocabulary
Socially deictic information can also be reflected in the choice of the vocabulary used.

5. Discourse deixis

Huang (2007: 172) argues that discourse deixis is concerned with the use of a linguistic expression within some utterance to point to the current, preceding or following utterances in the same spoken

or written discourse. Alternatively, discourse deixis can be said to refer to propositions.

A few ¹ illustrative examples from English are given in:

- a) *This is how birds evolved from predatory dinosaurs.*
- b) *That is tonight's evening news.*
- c) *Here goes the main argument.*
- d) *In the last section, we discussed conversational implicature, in this section, we consider conventional implicature, and in the next section, we shall ¹compare and contrast them.*
- e) *As already mentioned, the three main branches of the legal profession in England are solicitors, barristers and legal executive.*

Huang (2007: 172) explains that the use of the ¹ proximal demonstrative *this* in (a) anticipates information ¹ to be conveyed in an upcoming stretch of the discourse. The same is true of the use of the proximal adverb of space *here* in (c) ¹ by contrast, the use of the distal demonstrative *that* in (b) ¹ refers back to a preceding segment of the discourse. This is also the case with the use of *already* in (e). The terms *last*, *this*, and *next* used in (d) make reference to a preceding, current, and following portion of the discourse.

⁴ Moreover, according to Cruse (323-324) discourse deixis refers to such matter as the use of *this* to point to future discourse elements, that is, things which are about to be said, as in *Listen to this, it will kill you!* And that to point to past discourse elements, as in *that was not a very nice thing to say*. It is sometimes claimed that certain sentence adverbs, such as *therefore* and *furthermore* the recovery of the piece of previous discourse to be understood. A distinction can be made between discourse deixis and anaphora, although the two are obviously related. Anaphora picks up a previous reference to an extralinguistic entity and repeats it.

Conclusion

Expressions can be divided into deictic and non-deictic expression. Deictic expression or deictics are expressions that have a deictic usage as basic or central; non-deictic expressions do not have such a usage as basic or central. Furthermore, deictics can be used in gestural and also symbolic. Gestural use is the basic use, and symbolic use is the extended use. In general, if the deictic expressions can be used in symbolic it can be used in gestural way; but not vice versa.

There are some basic categories of deixis such as person deixis, temporal (time) deixis, spatial (space) deixis, social deixis and discourse deixis. Person deixis is related to with the identification of interlocutor or participant-roles in a speech event. The other deixis, temporal (time) deixis, is concerned with the encoding of temporal points and span relative to the time at which an utterance is produced in a speech event. Meanwhile, spatial (space) deixis is concerned with the specification of location in space relative to that of participant as CT in a speech event. There is also social deixis which is concerned with the codification of the social status of the speaker, the addressee, or a third person or entity referred to, as well as the social relationship holding between them. The last point, discourse deixis deals with such matter as the use of this to point to future discourse elements.

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PRESUPPOSITION

Introduction

One of the topics which is studied in pragmatics is presupposition. In Huang (2007: 64), it is found that in linguistics, the investigation of presupposition is concerned with a much wider range of phenomena, centring around the general debates about the interaction and division of labour between semantics and pragmatics. Thus, in this paper it will be explained all about presupposition which is divided into some topics starting from the nature of presupposition, the properties of presupposition and the types of presupposition.

What is presupposition?

Presupposition can be simply defined as an inference. In this case, Huang (2007:65) explains that presupposition whose truth is taken for granted in the utterance of a sentence. Its main function is to act as a precondition of some sentence for the appropriateness of that sentence. Furthermore, he argues that presupposition is usually generated by the use of particular lexical items and/or linguistic construction. Presupposition has in general been regarded as 'a heterogeneous

collection of quite distinct and different phenomena.’ Presupposition can be seen from these examples given by Huang (2007: 65) below:

- a. ¹ *The king of France is/isn’t bald.*
¹ presupposes that there is a king of France.
- b. *John knows/doesn’t know that Baird invented television.*
It presupposes that Baird invented television.

Meanwhile Yule (1996: 25) claims presupposition as something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance. Moreover, he adds that presupposition is treated as a relationship between two propositions. Simply, he explains this case by using these following sentences:

- a. *Mary’s dog is cute* (=p)
- b. *Mary has a dog* (=q)
- c. $p \gg q$ (p presupposes q)

Properties of Presupposition

It is explained in Huang (2007:67) that presuppositions exhibit a number of distinctive properties, notably: constancy under negation, defeasibility or cancellability and projection problem.

1. Constancy under Negation¹

Huang (2007: 65) explains that a presupposition generated by the use of a lexical item or a syntactic structure remains the same when the sentence containing that lexical item or syntactic structure is negated. It is supported by Yule (1996: 26) who states that the presupposition of a statement will remain constant (still true) even when that statement is negated. Furthermore, he explains that in these sentences as example:

- a. *Everybody knows that John is gay.*
(=p)
- b. *Everybody doesn’t know that John is gay.* (=NOT p)
- c. *John is gay.*
(=q)
- d. $p \gg q \ \& \ \text{NOT } p \gg q$

Yule (1996: 27) explains that, in this case although both speakers disagree about the validity of the statement in the sentences before, they both assume the true of the presupposition of *q*. it is presupposed that both *p* and *NOT p* remaining constant under negotiation.

2. Defeasibility or Cancellability

Huang (2007: 68) claims that presuppositions are cancelable. They are nullified if they are inconsistent with background assumption, conversational implicatures, and certain discourse context. They can also drop out in certain intrasentential context.

Firstly, presupposition can disappear in the face of inconsistency with background assumption or real – world knowledge. Huang (2007: 69) explains this case by using the example below:

- a. *John got an assistant professorship before he finished his Ph.D.*
(It presupposes that John finished his Ph.D)
- b. *John died before he finished his Ph.D*
(It doesn't carry presupposition because the putative presupposition conflicts with real – word knowledge that one cannot do anything after one dies)

Secondly, presupposition can be canceled by inconsistent conversational implicatures. Simply, it can be explained by using this sentence as consideration:

If John is organizing a stag night, Marry will be angry that he is doing so.

The use of factive of predicate *angry* in the sentence should give rise to the potential presupposition that John is organizing a stag night. However, it is also possible that John is not organizing a stag night.

Thirdly, presuppositions are contextually cancelable if they run contrary toward immediate discourse context tells about.

For example:

There is no king of France. Therefore the king of France is not bold.

(It should presuppose that there is a king of France.)

Presupposition also can be suspended by so called reduction arguments. Such in this example below:

Someone noticing the open door and asked: *Was it you who opened the door to the porch? I closed it at lunch time.* Someone else answer: *Well it was not me who opened it because I've been gone all afternoon and it wasn't Joan who opened it because he was with me and it wasn't any of the kids who opened it because they are on the field trip. And I strongly suspect that nobody opened it.* In this conversation it should bear the presupposition that someone opened the door to the porch. However, the second speaker's utterance is to convince that no one opened it.

Finally, presupposition can disappear with certain verbs of saying such as *say, mention, tell, ask,* and *announce* and certain verbs of propositional attitude such as *believe, think, imagine, dream,* and *want.*

3. The Projection Problem

The projection problem manifests itself in two opposite directions as stated by Huang (2007: 73). Moreover, he explains that on the one side of the projection point, the presupposition of a component sentence may felt to be projected on to and hence, inherited by the whole complex sentence. On the other sides, the presupposition of a component sentence may be preserved when that constituent sentence becomes part of more complex sentence.

Meanwhile, Yule (1996:30) explains this case as one version of the general idea that the meaning of the whole sentence is a combination of the meaning of its parts. However, the meaning of

some presuppositions (as parts) doesn't survive to become the meaning of some complex sentences (as wholes). Further, this case can be seen through the example below:

- a. *Blaine regrets getting Gigi pregnant.* (=p)
- b. *Blaine got Gigi pregnant.* (=q)
- c. $p \gg q$
- d. *He didn't get her pregnant.* (=r)
- e. *Blaine regrets getting Gigi pregnant, but he didn't get her pregnant.* (=p & r)
- f. $p \& r \gg \text{NOT } q$

In this case, one way to think about the whole sentence presented is an utterance by person reporting what happened actually.

Types of Presupposition

Yule (1996: 27) argues that in the analysis of how speakers' assumptions are typically expressed, presupposition has been associated with the use of a large number of words, phrases, and structures. He considers these linguistics forms as indicators of potential presuppositions which will be explained in these points below.

1. Lexical presupposition

In this case, Yule (1996: 28) claims that in lexical presupposition, the use of one form with its asserted meaning is conventionally interpreted with the presupposition that another (non-asserted) meaning is understood. It involves the lexical items such as *manage*, *try*, *stop*, *start*, and *again*. Further, he gives some examples as following:

- a) *He stopped smoking* (It can be presupposed that he used to smoke)
- b) *They started complaining* (It can be presupposed that they weren't complaining before)
- c) *You're late again* (It can be presupposed that you were late before)

2. Structural presupposition

Yule (1996: 28) explains that certain sentence structure has been analyzed as conventionally and regularly presupposing that part of the structure is already assumed to be true. For example, the WH Question construction in English is conventionally interpreted with the presupposition that the information after the WH form is already known to be the case as in this question below:

- a) *When did he leave?* (It is already known that he left)
- b) *Where did you buy the bike?* (You bought the bike)

3. Existential presupposition

As what stated by Yule (1996: 27) that existential presupposition is not only assumed found in possessive construction, but more generally in any definite non phrase by using any of expressions such as *the king of Sweden, the cat, the girl next to the door*, which the speaker is assumed to be committed to the assistant of the entities named.

4. Factive presupposition

Yule (1996: 27) describes factive presupposition as information that can be treated as a fact. It is usually signaled by a verb like *realize, regret* and also by phrases involving *be* with *aware, odd* and *glad*. Example:

- a) *She didn't realize he was ill* (It can be presupposed that he was ill)
- b) *We regret telling him* (It can be presupposed that we told him)
- c) *I'm glad that it is over* (It can be presupposed that it's over)

5. Non-factive presupposition

The other type of presupposition is non factive presupposition which explained by Yule (1996: 29) as one that is assumed not to be true. It uses verbs like *dream, imagine* and *pretend*. The examples are as follow:

- a) *I dreamed that I was rich* (It can be presupposed that I was not rich)
- b) *We imagine we were in Hawaii* (It can be presupposed that we were not in Hawaii)
- c) *He pretends to be ill* (It can be presupposed that he is not ill)

6. Counter-factual presupposition

Yule (1996: 29) explains that counter-factual presupposition refers to what is presupposed is not only not true, not is the opposite of what is true, or contrary to the fact. It can be seen from this sentence: *If you were my friend, you would have helped me*. It can be presupposed that you are not my friend.

Conclusion

Presupposition can simply define as something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance. It exhibits a number of distinctive properties, notably: constancy under negation, defeasibility or cancellability and projection problem. Presupposition is divided into some types. The first type is lexical presupposition which deals with the use of one form with its asserted meaning. The second type is structural presupposition. It is related to sentence structure which is conventionally and regularly presupposing that part of the structure is already assumed to be true. There is also existential presupposition which is more generally in any definite non phrase by using any of expressions which these speaker is assumed to be committed to the assistant of the entities named. The other type, factive presupposition refers to information that can be treated as a fact. Meanwhile, non factive presupposition is assumed not to be true. The last one, counter-factual presupposition refers to what is presupposed is not only not true, not is the opposite of what is true, or contrary to the fact.

3

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GRICE'S CONVERSATIONAL MAXIMS

Introduction

We can be briefer in communicating, since we don't need to say everything. We would need to if we were being perfectly logical. Hearers can use the maxims to infer a lot of information. (We don't say John has 4 and only 4 children). Imagine what would happen to language if there were no rules to follow during conversations. The nit would be perfectly acceptable to follow "Hi, how are you doing?" with "cars are typically made from steel", or to simply lie with every statement you made. But then communication would be virtually impossible. It is clear that in normal conversation we don't simply say whatever we please, but instead follow some general guidelines as to what is acceptable and what isn't. So, maxims are a well-known phrase that expresses a general truth about life or a rule about behavior.

In this paper will be discussed several types of maxim. They are: (1) what is maxim? (2) types of maxims a) quantity maxims b) quality maxims c) relation maxims d) manner maxims e) the relation

between the speaker and maxims f) flouting maxims g) hedging maxim.

What is Maxims?

Imagine what would happen to language if there were no rules to follow during conversations. The nit would be perfectly acceptable to follow "Hi, how are you doing?" with "cars are typically made from steel", or to simply lie with every statement you made. But then communication would be virtually impossible. It is clear that in normal conversation we don't simply say whatever we please, but instead follow some general guidelines as to what is acceptable and what isn't.

The question now is what exactly are these rules? One of the most basic assumptions we must make for successful communication to take place is that both people in a conversation are cooperating. This is called the Cooperative Principle (conceived originally by the Philosopher H. P. Grice.). Grice suggested that conversation is based on a shared principle of cooperation, something like, "Make your conversational contribution what is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged." This principle was fleshed out in a series of maxims.

Types of Conversational Maxims

1. Quantity Maxims

Quantity maxims as the initial phrases (*as you probably know, to cut a long story short, I won't bore you with all the details, I can't say anymore, I probably don't need to say this, but..*) produced in the course of speaker's account of her or his vacation (Yule: 1996). Then, Huang (2007:25) stated that there two terms of quantity maxims. They are:

- 3
- ✓ Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)
- ✓ Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Examples:

- *As you probably know*, I am terrified of bugs
- So, *to cut the long story short*, we grabbed our stuff and ran
- *I won't bore you with all the details*, but it was an exciting trip.

2. Quality Maxims

Quality maxims use to indicate that what we're saying may not be **1**tally accurate. It can use various phrases such as, *as far I know*, *I'm not sure if this is right and I guess, I may be wrong, but..* (Yule: 1996). Furthermore, Huang (2007:25) described that quality maxims are an effort to make your contribution one is true. They are two terms of quality maxims:

- 3**
- ✓ Do not say what you believe to be false
 - ✓ Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence

Examples:

- *As far as I know*, they're married
- *I'm not sure of this is right*, but I heard it was a secret ceremony in Hawaii
- He couldn't live without her, *I guess*

3. Relation Maxims

Yule (1996:38) stated that relation maxims can be found in the middle of speakers' talk when they say things like, " *oh, by the way*" and go on to mention some potentially unconnected information during a conversation. The maxim of relevance:

- ✓ say things that are relevant to the topic under discussion.

Huang (2007:25) relation maxims should be relevant. Speaker also seems to use expressions like ‘anyway’ or, ‘well, anyway’ to indicate that they may have drifted into a discussion of some possibly non-relevant material and want to stop. The example of relation maxim such, this may sound like a dumb question, not to change the subject. They are will be developed in examples below:

- *I don't know if this important*, but some of the files are missing
- *This may sound like a dumb question*, but whose hand writing is this?
- *Not to change the subject*, but is this related to the subject?

4. Manner Maxims

Huang (2007:25) sated that manner maxims should be perspicuous. There are some considerations of manner maxim. They are:

- ✓ Avoid obscurity of expression
- ✓ Avoid ambiguity
- ✓ Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)
- ✓ Be orderly.

Here, according to Yule (1996:39) and Huang (2007:27) stated that there are several words or phrases that can show the manner maxims.

- *I'm not sure if this clear, but...*
- *I don't know if this makes sense, but...*
- *This may be a bit tedious, but..*

Examples:

- *This may be a bit confused*, but I remember being in a car
- *I'm not sure if this makes sense*, but the car had no lights
- *I don't know if this is clear at all*, but I think the other car was reversing

1 The Relationship Between The Speaker and The Maxims

What can a speaker do with regard to the maxims? First, he or she can straightforwardly observe the maxims. Second, he or she can violate a maxim. For example, he or she may breach the first sub maxim of quality by telling deliberate lie. Third, he or she can opt out of a maxim

Flouting Maxims

Flouting a maxim is a particularly silent way of getting an addressee to draw an inference and hence recover an implicature. Thus there is a trade-off between abiding by maxims (the prototypical way of conducting a conversation) and flouting maxims (the most silent way of conveying implicit meaning) (Grundy, 2000: 78). If one tells a lie in English, one breaks one of Grice's maxims (the maxim of quality); but this does not mean that one fails to speak the English language (Leech, 1983: 8-9). The flouting of the conversational maxims can happen in some situations or occasions for some purpose.

Flouting maxims usually can be found on tautology, metaphor, overstatement, understatement, rhetorical question and irony.

- Tautology** is saying something again in different ways without making one's meaning clearer or more forceful, needless repetition (Hornby, 1974: 886). Usually tautology flouts the maxim of quantity. But uttering a tautology, speaker encourages listener to look for an informative interpretation of the non-informative utterance, it may be an excuse (Goody: 225), For example:

(a) War is war (b) Boys will be boys

It is tautology because there are repetition words and non-informative utterance.

- b. **Metaphor** is using of word to indicate something different from the literal meaning (Hornby, 1974: 533). In metaphor a word which in literal usage denotes one kind of things. Furthermore, metaphor flouts the maxim of quality. The use of metaphor is perhaps usually on record, but there is possibility that exactly which of the connotations of the speaker intends may be of record (Goody: 227). For example:

Harry is a real fish.

It means that he drinks or swims or is cold blooded like a fish

- c. **Overstatement** is exaggerated statement, so it is too or more informative (Hornby, 1974:600). It means that the speaker says more than is necessary that violating the maxim of quality. In another way, he may also convey implicature. For example:

“There were a million people in the room to night”

This example is classified as overstatement because use exaggeration statement (a million people), therefore, the information is more informative.

- d. In **understatement**, the statement is less informative or too economical so it is not informative (Hornby, 1974:940). Understatement is one way of generating implicature by saying less than is required.
- e. In **rhetorical question**, one asked for the sake of effect, to impress people, no answer being needed or expected (Hornby,1974: 728). For example:

How many times do I have to tell you?"

This example is classified as rhetorical question because the speaker does not expect the answer from the hearer

- f. **Irony** is expression of one's meaning by saying something, which is the direct opposite of one's thoughts, in order to make one's remark forceful (Hornby, 1974:450). By saying the opposite of what means, again violation of quality maxims, speaker can directly convey his intended meaning. For example: "John *is real genius* (after John has done stupid act) Based on definition, these examples is classified as irony because the speakers said the opposite not the real condition.

Hedging Maxims

Hedges may intentionally or unintentionally be employed in both spoken and written language since they are crucially important in communication. Hedges help speakers and writers communicate more precisely the degree of accuracy and truth in assessments. For instance, in "*All I know is smoking is harmful to your health*"

All I know is a hedge that indicates the degree of the speaker's knowledge instead of only making a statement, "Smoking is harmful to your health". Interestingly, from pragmatics aspects, hedges indicate how Gricean maxims are observed. In this case, hedges are markers tied to the expectation of the maxims of quantity, quality, manner, and relevance. (1) All I know is, smoking is harmful to your health. In (1), it can be observed that information conveyed by the speaker is limited by adding *all I know* and *as you probably know*.

The most function of hedges is as softeners. They are (i) to soften claim, e.g., *The data appear to support the assumptions*, (ii) to soften complaint, e.g. *Excuse me I think, I came here before her*, (iii) to soften request, e.g. *I was wondering if probably you could bring me another cup*, (iv) to soften command, e.g. *open that window, will you?*, (v) To soften per formative, e.g. *I can promise you that we will be there on time*, To soften criticism, e.g. *well, personally, I think it would be better if the table was placed here*

Conclusion

There are some principles based on Grice's theory used by a speaker in order to have a cooperative conversation. Grice's theory elaborates it into quantity maxim, quality maxim, relation maxim and manner maxim. In this case there are several relationships that a speaker regards with the maxims. First, the speaker can observe the maxims. Second, he/she can violate a maxim. Third, he/she can opt out the maxims and the last one the speaker can flout or exploit the maxim. All of the guiding principles for talk that speakers orient to these principles (the maxims suggested by Grice's theory) as they communicate will lead the speaker to what called as hedging maxim.

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IMPLICATURES

Introduction

It is stated by Mey (1993: 98) that the word ‘implicature’ derived from the verb ‘to imply,’ as is its cognate ‘implication.’ Further, he explains that etymologically, ‘to imply’ means ‘to fold something into something else’ (from the Latin verb *plicare* ‘to fold’); hence, that which is implied, is ‘folded in,’ and has to be ‘unfolded’ in order to be understood. Implicature is divided into two: conversational implicature and conventional implicature. In this paper, it will be explained what conversational and conventional implicature are along with its properties. Besides, there is also explanation about generalized implicature and its part: scalar implicatures and particularized implicatures.

Conversational Implicatures

Cruse (2000: 349) defines conversational implicatures as characterized by propositions or assumptions not encoded, completely or incompletely in what actually said. Meanwhile Huang (2007: 27) explains that based on Grice’s theory, **conversational**

implicature is a set of non-logical inferences, which contains conveyed messages that are meant without being part of what is said in the strict sense.

Properties of conversational implicatures

In order to distinguish conversational implicatures from other semantic/pragmatic phenomena there are some criteria of conversational implicatures which are not entirely logically independent from one another.

a. Context dependence

Cruse (2000: 349) explains that expression with a single meaning (in example expressing the same proposition) can give rise to different conversational implicatures in different context. For example, in this sentence:

A : *Have you cleared the table and washed the dishes?*

B : *I've cleared the table.*

A : ³ *Am I in time for supper?*

B : *I've cleared the table.*

The meaning of the utterance from the first conversation will be different from the second one since they used in different context.

b. Defeasibility / Cancellability

Cruse (2000: 350) states that conversational implicatures can be canceled by additional material without contradiction or anomaly. For example:

A : *Did the minister attend the meeting and sign the agreement?*

B1 : *The minister attended the meeting.*

B2 : *The minister attended the meeting; a statement will be issued later with regard to the agreement.*

In this case, the first answer stands a quite strong presumption that the minister did not sign the agreement. However, the additional material in the second answer suppresses the implicature.

In addition, Huang (2007:32) states that conversational implicatures can simply disappear in certain linguistic or non-linguistic context, which is called as defeasibility/ cancellability. They are cancelled if they are inconsistency with (i) semantic entailments, (ii) background assumptions, (iii) context, and (iv) priority conversational implicatures.

c. **Non-Detachability**

Cruse (2000: 350) states that the same propositional contents in same context will always give rise to the same conversational implicature, in whatever form it is expressed. For example:

- *John did not manage to walk as far as the crossroads*
- *John attempted to walk as far as the crossroads.*
- *John didn't walk as far as the crossroads.*

Moreover, Huang (2007: 34) explains that in conversational implicatures, any linguistics expression with the same semantic content tends to carry the same conversational implicature. This is because conversational implicatures are attached to the semantic content, rather than the linguistic form. Therefore, they cannot be detached from an utterance simply by replacing the relevant linguistics expressions with their synonyms. Huang gives the exam¹e as below:

The film almost/nearly won/came closer to winning an Oscar. (The film did not quite win an Oscar)

d. **Calculability**

Cruse (2000: 351) states that a conversational implicatures must be calculable, using statable general principle, on the basis of conventional meaning together with contextual information.

Based on Huang (2007: 34), calculability means that conversational implicatures can transparently be derived via the cooperative principle and its components maxims.

Generalized Implicatures

Huang (2007: 32) argues that generalized implicature has a very general currency. Moreover, the utterance will have default interpretation. In addition, Yule (1996: 40) explains that in the case of generalized implicatures, special knowledge of the context of utterance is not required in order to make the necessary inferences. The example of generalized implicatures can be taken from this sentence suggested by Huang (2007: 31):

Most of John's friends believe in marriage.

From the sentence, it simply can be interpreted that not all of John's friends believe in marriage.

a. Scalar Implicatures

It is explained by Yule (1996: 41) that information is always communicated by choosing a word which expresses one value from a scale of values. This is particularly obvious in terms for expressing quantity such as *all, most, many, some, few, always, often, or sometimes*.

Moreover, he argues that when producing an utterance, a speaker selects the word from the scale which is the most informative and truthful in the circumstances as in this utterance; *I am studying Linguistics and I've completed some of the required courses*. By choosing *some* in this utterance, the speaker creates a scalar implicature.

There are many scalar implicatures produce by the use of expression that may not immediately considered to be part of any scale, like *possible* or *should*. For example:

It is possible that they were delayed.

This should be stored in a cool place.

One noticeable feature of scalar implicature is that when speakers correct themselves on some detail they typically cancel one of the scalar implicature. Such in this sentence, *I got some of this jewelry in Hongkong – mm actually I think I got most of it there.*

b. Particularized Implicatures

Yule (1996: 42) states that particularized conversational implicatures deals with the inferences which are required to work out the conveyed meaning. As example:

*Rick : Hey, coming to the wild party tonight?
Tom : My parents are visiting.*

In order to make Tom's response relevant, Rick has to draw on the assumed knowledge that he cannot go to the party, because he would rather see his parents.

Another example can be seen from dialog below:

*Bert : Do vegetarians eat hamburgers?
Ernie : Do chicken have lips?*

In this case, the answer is already known; the question does not need to be asked.

Conventional Implicatures

Cruse (2000: 350) explains that conventional implicature is the name given by some to non-truth conditional aspect of meaning which are conventionally attached to particular linguistic forms. Meanwhile, according to Huang (2007: 54), a conventional implicature is a non-truth-conditional inference, which is not deductive in any general, natural way from the saying of what is said, but arises solely because the conventional features attached to particular lexical item and/or linguistic constructions. For example:

1
He is a Chinese; he therefore knows how to use chopstick.

1
In this sentence, the conventional implicature triggered by the use of *therefore* is that being Chinese provides some good reason for knowing how to use chopstick.

1
There are other representative lexical items that are considered to engender conventional implicatures in English include *actually, also, anyway, barely, besides, however, manage to, on the other hand, only, still, though, too, and yet.*

Conclusion

Implicatures is needed in interpreting what is someone saying. There are two common implicatures known, they are conversational implicatures and conventional implicatures. Conversational implicatures deals with set of non-logical inferences, which contains conveyed messages. There are some properties of conversational implicature such as context dependence, defeasibility or cancellability, non-detachability and calculability. Meanwhile conventional implicatures refers to non-truth conventional aspect of meaning which are conventionally attached to particular linguistic forms.

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SPEECH ACTS

Introduction

Traditionally linguistic theory is grouped into three subdivisions: syntax, semantics and pragmatics, sometimes just referred to as semiotic. Syntax is concerned with the structures of the visible forms of language. Syntactic rules determines the way in which linguistic elements (as letters, words, etc.) are put together to form constituents (as phrases or clauses). Semantics deals with the meaning of languages, both of the individual language elements, e.g. words, and the meaning of composite language structures, e.g. sentences. Semantics is usually given by mapping the syntactic constructs into some semantic domain, e.g. the meaning of propositional logics given by values of true and false. Pragmatics is about the issues of language use. Pragmatics is perhaps the most difficult aspect of linguistics to define precisely. Pragmatic aspects are also often difficult to give a formal, i.e. mathematical/logical based, definition and pragmatics is sometimes called the 'waste-basket' of linguistics [35], i.e. all language phenomena that cannot be classified as syntax or semantics are pragmatics. The reason why pragmatics is

hard to understand and formalize is that it deals with language and its users in a social context.

On our view the meaning of the speech act is best understood if we understand how the speech act is meant to influence the cognitive states of the conversant in the context of a social activity. The force of a speech act lies in its unique distribution of effect on the cognitive sub states of the social agents.

In this paper will be described several points about speech acts. (a) the definition of speech acts (b) locutionary, perlocutionary and illocutionary (c) condition for successful performance of speech acts (d) speech acts classification (e) and direct and indirect speech act.

What is Speech Acts?

Speech act is the usage of language to accomplish something. Actions performed via utterances are called speech acts (*e.g., apology, complaint, compliment, invitation, promise, and request*). The speaker normally expects that his or her communicative intention will be recognized by the hearer -both speaker and hearer are helped by the circumstances surrounding the utterance. These circumstances (including other utterances) are called the speech event. Example: *The tea is really cold!*

Locutionary, Perlocutionary and Illocutionary Acts

Austin (1962) in Huang (2007:102) classifies that there are 3 facts of speech act. They are locutionary, Perlocutionary and Illocutionary Acts.

a. Locutionary acts

Locutionary acts is the basic act of speaking, which itself consist of three related subacts. They are (i) **a phonic** act of producing an utterance-inscription (ii) **a phatic** act of composing a particular linguistic expression in a particular language, and (iii) **a phatic** act of contextualizing the utterance-inscription. They are concerned with the physical act of making a certain sequence of vocal sound (in the case of spoken language) or a set of written symbol (in the case of written language), the act of constructing a well-

formed string of sounds/symbols, it is a word, phrase or sentence, in a particular language and the speaker is responsible for tasks such as assigning reference, resolving deixis and disambiguating the utterance-inscription lexically and/or grammatically.

b. Perlocutionary acts

A perlocutionary act concerns the effect an utterance may have on the addressee. Then, it's the acts by which the illocutionary produces a certain effect in or exerts a certain influence on the addressee. So, the effect of the act performed by a speaking is also generally known as the perlocutionary effect. Moreover, Cruse (2000:332) argues that perlocutionary acts are acts performed by means of language, using language as a tool. The elements which define the act are external to the locutionary act.

c. Illocutionary acts

When we say something, we usually say it with some purpose in mind. This is the illocutionary acts. In other words, illocutionary acts refers to the type of function the speaker intends to fulfill or the type of action the speaker intends to accomplish in the course of producing an utterance. Example of illocutionary acts including accusing, apologizing, blaming, congratulating, giving permission, joking, nagging, naming, promising, ordering, fusing, swearing, and thanking. Then, Cruse (2000:332) adds that illocutionary acts are acts which are internal to the locutionary act, in the sense that.

So, the explanation about three facts of speech act, it can be drawn by using table.

Table 1: Three Facts of Speech Act

Locutionary Acts	Illocutionary Acts	Perlocutionary Acts
The production of a meaningful linguistic expression	The action intended to be performed by a speaker in uttering a linguistic expression, by	The bringing about of sequences of effects on the audience through the uttering of a linguistic

	1 virtue of the conventional force associated with it, either explicitly or implicitly.	1 expression, such consequences or effects being special to the circumstances of the utterance.
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Condition for Successful Performance of Speech Acts

5 (1989:343) states that there are normally contextual conditions which must be fulfilled before a speech act can be said to have been properly performed. 5 these are usually called happiness condition or felicity conditions. Some of these are of course condition on any short of linguistic communication, such as the fact that speaker and hearer understand one another (usually speak the same language), can hear one another and so on. There are several conditions:

5 a. Preparatory conditions

Preparatory conditions do not define the speech act, but are necessary in the sense that if they do not hold, 5 the act has not been carried out (it is said have misfired). In the case of declarative speech acts, the person performing the act must have authority to do it, and must do it in appropriate circumstances and with appropriate actions. For instance, it is not enough to someone to break a bottle 5 of champagne on the bows of a ship and say *I name this ship Venus*, for the ship either to acquire an official name, or to change its name. a proper ceremony must be enacted, with officially recognized participants. The same is true or christening a baby. Even in the case of resigning from a job or position, jus saying the words *I resign*, at breakfast, say, does not constitute a resignation: there are proper ways 5 resigning and channels for communicating such a decision. In the case of a promise, the hearer must prefer the promised action's accomplishment to its non accomplishment, and the speaker must have reason to believe that eventuality promised will not happen in the formal course of events. For a command, the speaker must be in authority over the hearer, must believe that the desired action has not already been carried out, and that it is possible for the hearer to carry it out.

b. Sincerity condition

5

The sincerity condition must be fulfilled the person performing the act must have appropriate beliefs or feelings. For instance, in performing an act or asserting, the speaker must believe the proposition they are expressing; when thanking someone, one ought to feelings of gratitude; when making a promise, and one should sincerely intend to carry it out, and so on. If the sincerity conditions are not met, the act is actually performed, but there is said to be an abuse (Cruse, 1989:344).

c. Essential condition

Essential conditions basically define the acts being carried out. Thus for a promise, the speaker must intend his utterance to put him under an obligation to carried out the act which corresponds to its propositional content. For a request, the speaker must intend that the utterance count as an attempt to get the hearer to do what is requested; for a statement, the hearer must intend that the utterance count as a guarantee of the truth of the statement; for a question, the hearer must intend that the utterance count as attempt to elicit the appropriate answer from the hearer, and so on. If the essential conditions are not met, the act has not really been carried out.

d. Content condition

5

Cruse (1989:344-345) said that prototypically, the hearer should recognize the speaker's intention to perform the illocutionary act in question in uttering the words in question. This is called uptake. Uptake must be distinguishing form acceptance: the fact that one refuse to accept, say, an apology or a resignation does not mean that the speaker's intention has not been recognized. Generally, uptake does not seem to be a necessary condition for speech acts, but there are doubtful cases. Take the case of boasting.

5

There are indications that it is still a boast. First it is anomalous to say: *john tried to boast, but everyone thought he was just stating the facts*. Second, one can hear a statement and subsequently find

out that someone was boasting. *He told me he had just lost £10,000- I didn't realize at the time that he was boasting.*

Then, content condition is depending on the type illocutionary point, IP, used in an utterance; there may be different conditions on the illocutionary content [11]. For example, one cannot make a promise (commissive regarding the past (unless, of course, the speaking agent has a time machine available): *I promise to start working at 9 AM in last week*

Speech Acts Classification

1. Assertive / representative

5

Cruse (2000: 342) states that assertive commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition: state, suggest, boast, complain, claim, report, and warn (that). Both boast and complain also express an attitude to the proposition expressed other than a belief in its truth. While the purpose of assertive is to inform what the speaker belief such Kreidler (2001:183-185) argues that the speaker or writer use assertive language to tell what they know or believe (Yule p. 53). This language concerned with knowledge, cognition, data, what exists or existed and what is happening or has happened or not. So assertive utterances are either true or false, generally they can be verified or falsified or they are subject to empirical investigation.

Reported assertive divides into three:

1) Indirect assertive

Examples:

2

- a. I voted for Aaronson in the last election.
- b. Most plastic are made from soy beans.
- c. Cape Ann Lighthouse is a mile from the beach.

2) Direct assertive

Examples:

2

- a. I voted for Aaronson in the last election.

- b. Most plastic are made from soy beans.
- c. Cape Ann Lighthouse is a mile from the beach.

3) Assertive verbs 2

Assertive verbs followed by a full clause. They include allege, announce, report, remind, predict, protest. They are independent of time or aspect, neutral with respect to who is involved i₂ what reported, and comment on a state of affairs. Example: Jarvis announced that he is voting for Aaronson in the last election.

Assertive (the illocutionary point) has a direction of fit of word-to-world the psychological state B for the sincerity condition to hold must be that the speaker believes B the propositional content expressed p. Example: The speaker states: *The door is open* and believes that the door is open.

2. Directives

Yule (1996: 54) describes that directives are kind of speech act that speaker use to get someone else to do something (Huang p.107). They express what the speaker wants. They are commands, orders, requests, advice, and suggestions. It can be positive or negative. In using a directive, the speaker intends to i₁cit some future course of action on the part of the addressee, thus making the world match the words via the addressee.

Kreidler (2001: 189) states that a directive utterance is prospective; one cannot tell other people to do something in the past. A directive utterance presupposes certain condition in the addressee and in the context and situation. When the utterance can be carried out, the utterance is felicitous, and if not, it is infelicitous. Three kinds of directive utterances can be recognized: commands, request, and suggestions.

The directive has a direction of fit of world-to-word; the psychological state must be that the speaker wants that the hearer H do the action A. Example: The speaker gives the command *Open the door!* and wants the door to be opened.

Command

It is effective only if the speaker has some degree of control over the action of the addressee. It can be produced with various degrees of explicitness. They have the form *you must ...* or they are imperative sentences.

Examples:

- a. I (hereby) order you to appear in court next Monday at 10 a.m.
- b. I'm telling you not to waste your time on that.

Request

It is an expression of what the speaker wants the addressee to do or refrain from doing.

Examples:

- a. I appeal to you to help as much as you can.
- b. We beg you to stay out of the way.

Suggestion

They are the utterances that we make other person to give our opinions as what they should or should not do

Examples:

- a. I advise you to be prompt; I warn you not to be late.
- b. We suggest you (should) pay more attention to what you're doing.

3. Verdictive

Kreidler (2001:187-188) state that verdictives are speech acts in which the speaker makes an assessment or judgement about the acts of another, usually the addressee. These include ranking, assessing, appraising, condoning. Verdictive verbs includes

accuse, charge, excuse, thank in the utterance frame *I you of/for ...-ing*. Since these utterances present the speaker's assessment of the addressee's previous action(s) or of what has befallen the addressee, they are retrospective.


The action is viewed positively:

Commend ...for
compliment ...on
congratulate ...for
Honor ... for
praise ...for

The action is viewed negatively:

Accuse ...of
Blame ...for
Admonish For

2
A verdictive utterance has this structure:



Examples:


- a. *I accuse you of putting on airs.*
- b. *I congratulate you for performing so well.*
- c. *The major blamed the media for not accurately reporting his accomplishments.*


4. Commissive

Cruse (2000: 342) states that commissives commit the speaker to some future action: promise, vow, offer, undertake, contract, and threaten. Kreidler (2001: 192) defines that commissive utterance as speech act that commit a speaker to a course of action. Where commissive verbs are illustrated by agree, ask, offer, refuse, and swear, all with following infinitives. Further, the verb must be in the present tense and there are some addressee, whether the utterance show it or not, since the speaker must be making a commitment to somebody. A commissive predicate is one that can be used to commit oneself to some future action. Commissive predicates can be classified this way:

- a) Response to directive
 - Positive response: agree consent
[Agree is more common]
 - Negative response: refuse decline
[Refuse is stronger, decline more formal, more polite]
- b) Self-motivated (not response to directive)
 - Benefactive: offer volunteer
[Volunteer suggest a more formal commitment]
 - Malefactive: threaten
- c) Focus on speech act
 - Pledge promise swear
[Promise is unmarked; a pledge is a solemn promise made in public; to swear is to take a semi-religious oath]

The structure of a sentence with a commissive predicate is this:





In a commissive utterance the subject is *I* or *we*. Felicity conditions: the capable of the act and intends to perform it; the addressee has faith in the speaker's ability and intention.

5. Expressive

Kreidler (2001: 188) argues that expressive utterances are retrospective and speaker-involved. The most common expressive verbs are acknowledge, admit, confess; deny; apologize.

Examples:

- a. *I acknowledge that I did not do what I should have done.*
- b. *We admit that we were mistaken.*
- c. *I apologize for having disturbed you.*

6. Declarative/performative

Kreidler (2001: 185-186) defines performative is kinds of speech act that bring about the state of affair: bids, blessing, firings, baptisms, arrests, marrying, declaring a mistrial. While Yule (1996: 53) argues that declarations are kinds of speech act that change the word via the utterance. And Searle in Mey (1993: 131) states that the point of this case is to bring something about in the world; which have both a word-to-world and world-to-word direction of fit; in which nno phycological state is expressed; in which any proposition can occur, e.g. an excommunication. Performatives take place in formal setting and are concerned with official acts. Its purpose is to make a part of the world conform to

what is said. ² Performative utterances are valid if spoken by someone whose right to make them is accepted and in circumstances which are accepted as appropriate.

There are strong limitations on what can be a performative utterance:

- 1) The subject of the sentence must be *I* or *we*
E.g. I declare this meeting is adjourned.
- 2) The verb must be in present tense.

Moreover, declaratives are used in assertions. They serve to convey information. They are characterized by having truth conditions.

- a. *The dog ate the bone.*
- b. *John slept until 11 and missed his first two classes.*
- c. *If I don't get this paper in by 5:00 I'll lose a letter grade.*

Exa⁵mples of declarative such as follows:

- 1) *Priest: I now pronounce you husband and wife.*
- 2) *Referee: you're out.*
- 3) ² *Jury Foreman: We find the defendant guilty.*
- 4) *I sentence you to 90 days in prison.*

Huang (2007: ¹⁸) classifies performatives into two types: explicit and implicit. Explicit performatives are performative utterances which contain a performative verb that makes explicit what ¹ kind of act is being performed. By contrast, implicit performatives are performative utterances in which there is no such a verb. In order to account for implicit perform¹atives, an analysis is known as the performative hypothesis. The basic idea of the hypothesis is that underlying every sentence there is a 'hidden' matrix performative clause.

Example:

1

I (hereby) Vp you (that) S. Where Vp is a performance verb, and S is a complement clause.

Phatic utterance

2

Yule (1996: 194) states that the purpose of phatic utterance is to establish rapport between members of the same society. Phatic language has less obvious function than other classifications of speech act. Phatic utterances include greetings, farewell, polite formulas such as “thank you”, “you are welcome”, “excuse me” when these are not really verdictive or expressive. They also include all sorts of comments on the weather, asking about one’s health, and whatever is usual, and therefore expected, in a particular society. Stereotyped phrases are common for conveying good wishes to someone starting to eat meal, beginning voyage, undertaking a new venture, or celebrating a personal or social holiday.

Felicity conditions are met when speaker and addressee share the same social customs and recognize phatic utterance for what they are. The examples of phatic utterance are “I’m glad to see you”, “So nice to see you again”

Direct and Indirect Speech Acts

1. Direct Speech Acts

How can we recognize direct speech acts when we see them? Sometimes the form of the sentence gives us a clue and while sometimes performative verbs will be present to help us identify the speech acts being performed, we must be careful not to be duped by them.

- a. I advised you well, didn't I?
- b. He warns me not to drive drunk.

Direct Speech Act is whenever there is a direct relationship between a structure and a function:

You wear a seat belt. (declarative)

Do you wear a seat belt? (interrogative)

Wear a seat belt! (imperative)

2. Indirect Speech

Indirect speech acts are characterized by the use of language to perform a speech act without actually using a form appropriate for that speech act. Then, indirect speech is if the relationship between structure and function. While that might sound fairly mysterious, indirect speech acts are actually extremely common we all use those dozens of times a day.

- a. *Could you close the door?*
Please close the door.
- b. *There are wolves on the prowl tonight?*
I'm warning you to watch out for wolves.
- c. *I think it would be good if you sold that heap you call a car.* [I advise you to sell your car.]

Example: A declarative used to make a statement is a direct speech act, a declarative used to make a request is an indirect speech act.

- a. *Its cold outside*
- b. *I hereby tell you about the weather* (direct speech act)
- c. *I hereby request that you close the door* (indirect speech act)

It can be concluded that indirect speech acts are generally associated with greater politeness than direct speech acts.

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POLITENESS AND INTERACTION

Introduction

There is no doubt that the cooperative principle can go way some towards explaining the generation of implicatures. But one class of implicatures which receives no account under this heading concerns implicatures of politeness. Leech has proposed an independent pragmatic principle, to function alongside the co-operative principle, which calls the politeness principle.

In this paper, we will describe about Politeness Principle and Maxim. Here, there are several points that will be elaborated. They are: 1. Politeness and Interaction (negative and positive face and positive and negative politeness) 2. The Politeness Maxims (a) the tact maxim (b) the generosity maxim (c) the praise maxim (d) the modesty maxim (e) the agreement maxim (f) the sympathy maxim (g) and the consideration maxim.

Politeness and Interaction

Politeness has proposed an independent pragmatic principle, to function alongside the co-operative principle (Cruse, 2000:361). In other words, politeness is a matter of what is said, and not a matter of what is thought or believed.

Much of what we say and communicate is determined by our social relationships. A linguistic interaction is necessarily a social interaction. External factors relating to social distance/closeness are established prior to an interaction: relative status of the participants as determined by factors like age and power. Speakers who see themselves as lower status tend to **mark** social distance between themselves and status speakers by using **address forms** that **include a title and a last name, but not the first name** (Mrs. Jones, Mr. Adams, and Dr. Miller).

Then, internal factors (amount of imposition, degree of friendliness) are negotiated during an interaction can result in the initial social distance changing and being marked as less or more during the course of the interaction (e.g., moving to first name basis). These factors are more relevant to participants whose social relationships are actually in the process of being worked out within the interaction.

Both types of factors (external/internal) have an influence on what we say and how we are interpreted: interpretation includes also evaluations such as 'rude', 'considerate' or 'thoughtful' which represent an additional aspect of communication perceived in terms of **politeness**.

Furthermore, Cruse (2000:361) describes the politeness through this principle:

1. Minimize the expression of impolite beliefs.
A politeness does not essentially concern belief. It does have the merit of throwing the weight on to expression.
2. Choose expressions which minimally belittle the hearer's status
The sorts of thing which may be thought to belittle the hearer's status are:

- a. Treating the hearer as subservient to one's will, by desiring the hearer to do something which will cost effort, or restrict freedom
- b. Saying bad things about the hearer or people or things related to the hearer
- c. Expressing pleasure at the hearer's misfortunes
- d. Praising oneself or dwelling on one's good fortune, or superiority
- e. Disagreeing with the hearer, thus denigrating the hearer's thoughts

The purpose of politeness is the maintenance of harmonious and smooth social relations in the face of the necessity to convey belittling messages.

Negative and Positive Face

A person's negative face is the need to be independent, to have a freedom of action, and not to be imposed on by others. The word negative here doesn't mean bad just the opposite. It includes an apology, imposition and interruption. On the other hand, a person's positive face is the needed to accepted, even like others, to be treated as a member of the same group, his or her wants are shared by others. It includes showing solidarity. In simple terms negative face is the need to be independent and positive face is the need to be connected (Yule, 1996:62).

Comparative Table about Negative and Positive Face

Negative face	Positive Face
Need to be independent, to have freedom of action, not be imposed on by others	Need to be accepted/liked, to be treated as a member of the same group, to know that wants are shared by others

Positive and Negative Politeness

Yule (1996: 64) describes that a positives politeness strategy leads the requester to appeal to a common goal, even friendship, via expression such as:

a. *How about letting me use your pen?*

b. *Hey, buddy, I'd appreciate it if you'd let me use your pen.*

However, in most English-speaking contexts, a face saving act is more commonly performed via a negative politeness strategy. The most typical form used is a question containing a modal verb such as:

a. *Could you lend me a pen?*

b. *I'm sorry to bother you, but can I ask you for a pen or something.*

Face	Politeness
The public self-image of a person (emotional and social sense of self one has and expects everyone else to recognize)	The means employed to show awareness of another person's face, showing awareness for a socially distant person's face respect, deference showing awareness for a socially close person's face friendliness, solidarity

The Politeness Maxims

Cruse (2000:363) divides several kinds of politeness maxims. They are:

1. The Tact Maxim

The tact maxim is oriented towards the hearer and has positive and negative sub-maxims:

- *Minimize cost to the hearer*
- *Maximize benefit to the hearer*

The operation of this maxim can be clearly seen in the context of impositives. The term of impositives includes command, request, etc.

- *Lend me your pen*
- *Say Ah!*
- *Wash the dishes*
- *Have another sandwich*
- *Past the salt*
- *Have a nice weekend*

It is obvious that the linguistic form of the impositive is not going to affect the real cost or benefit to hearer. What the maxims means is that in order to get a hearer to do something which involve a cost, a polite speaker will cast his utterance in a form which softens the effect of impositive. To get the hearer to do something to his or her benefits, a polite speaker will strengthen the impositive. What is meant by softening, or weakening n impositive is essentially making it easier for the hearer to refuse. Example:

- a. *Could you wash the dishes?*
- b. *Wash the dishes!*
- c. *I was wondering if you could possibly wash the dishes*

Utterance (a) is more polite than (b) and (c) is even more polite

2. The Generosity Maxim

The generosity maxim is a sister to the tact maxim, and is oriented towards costs and benefits to the speaker:

- *Minimize benefits to self*
- *Maximize cost to self*

This maxim works in a way parallel to that of the tact maxim. Except that the effects are reversed. So, for instance offers to do

something which involves benefits to her or his hearer, but cost to the speaker must be made as directly as possible, for politeness (a) is more polite than (b).

- a. *Let me wash the dishes*
- b. *I was wondering if I could possibly wash the dishes*

On the other hand, politeness demands that request for benefits to the speaker be weakened:

- a. *I want to borrow your car*
- b. *Could I possibly borrow your car?*

3. The Praise Maxim

The maxims of praise from another natural duo concerned with the expression of positive or negative opinions about speaker or hearer. The maxim of praise is oriented towards the hearer and goes as follows:

- *Minimize dispraise of the hearer*
- *Maximize praise of the hearer*

As usual, negative politeness is the moral crucial. The effect is to tone down any critic of unfavorable comment:

- A : *Do you like my new dress?*
- B : *No. Well, yes, but it's not my favorite*

- A : *Oh, I've been so thoughtless*
- B : *Yes, haven't you? Not at all-think anything of it.*

The effect of the second sub-maxim is to exaggerate praise:

Thank you so much for inviting us. We had absolutely wonderful time.

4. The Modesty Maxim

The modesty maxim is the natural partner of the previous one, being oriented towards the speaker, with the relevant 'values' reversed:

- *Minimize praise of self*
- *Maximize dispraise of self*

Praising oneself is inherently impolite, so negative politeness here is matter of toning down self-congratulation:

- A : *You did brilliantly!*
B : *Yes, did not I?*
Well, I thought I did not do too badly

Positive politeness under this heading, that is, exaggerating protestations of worthlessness, tends in the direction of groveling: *Your majesty, I am a mere worm, a distinguish toad, a dog's turd, and I deserve no forgiveness! I throw myself at Your Majesty's feet!*

5. The Agreement Maxim

Agreement is a relation between the opinions of the speaker and those of the hearer. One cannot contrast an orientation towards self with an orientation towards hearer, as with praise, and benefit/cost: it does not matter whether agreement forms a bipolar scale or not.

- *Minimize disagreement with the hearer*
- *Maximize agreement with the hearer*

The sub-maxims are not clearly distinct. A typical strategy is to begin with partial agreement before expressing disagreement:

- A : *She should be sacked immediately. We cannot tolerate unpunctuality.*
- B : *I disagree.*
I agree with the general principle, but in this case there are mitigating circumstances.

6. The Sympathy Maxim

Sympathy is again a matter of a relation between speaker and hearer, and cannot, therefore, be differentially speaker-or hearer-oriented. Maximize sympathy (expression of positive feelings) towards the hearer. Minimize sympathy (expression of negative feelings) towards the hearer.

This maxim renders congratulation and commiserations or condolences inherently polite acts. It seems when someone can speak of implicatures of politeness only if a discrepancy can be intuited between what the speaker says and what he or she feels. It minimize antipathy/maximize sympathy between self and other

I was very sorry to hear about your father's death

7. The Consideration Maxim

Leech present the consideration maxim as a separate principle (the Pollyanna Principle), it is very justification as it works just like the other maxim:

- *Minimize the hearer's discomfort/displeasure*
- *Maximize the hearer's comfort/pleasure*

Negative politeness under this maxim involves the softening, by various devices of references to painful, distressing, embarrassing or shocking events, facts, or things, etc. For instance, if someone's husband has recently died, it is more polite to *say I was sorry to hear about your husband* than *I was sorry to hear*

about your husband's death, as the latter highlights the distressing event to a greater degree. Another typical manifestation of this sub-maxim is euphemism, where indirectness of various kinds is employed to avoid mention of words likely to cause offence.

Conclusion

In conclusion, politeness principle is utterances that related to speaker's or listener's behavior, etiquette, and culture. Politeness is very useful in conversation to smoothen utterances in different contexts. Politeness includes several principles such as tactful, generous, modest and sympathetic toward others.

Politeness can be defined as the means employed to show awareness of another person's face. First is negative and positive face. it is expectations that concern public self-image, or their face wants will be respected. And the second one is positive and negative politeness. Positive politeness leads the requester to appeal to a common goal, and even friendship. Meanwhile, the negative politeness is typically expressed by questions.

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